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Abstract
This thesis includes three essays in mutual funds, empirical finance, and asset pricing.
The first essay explores the relation between mutual fund ownership and how it
affects firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements. The essay classifies
mutual funds into CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly funds using a holdings-based, valueweighted mutual fund corporate social rating (MFCSR). The empirical results show that
firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are associated with increased future levels of
CSR and the firms with higher CSR-unfriendly ownership are associated with decreased
future levels of CSR. This result is robust after controlling for many observable firm
characteristics and firm-specific unobservable characteristics and suggests that mutual
fund shareholders’ CSR beliefs are important determinants of a firm’s social
performance.
The second essay examines whether credit markets react to linguistic tone of
accounting disclosures. The essay uses event study analyses and finds that high levels of
uncertain tone in the 10-Q/K filings lead to a significant increase in credit default swap
(CDS) spreads around the disclosure date. This finding is consistent with uncertainty in
language, increasing perceived default risk. The magnitude of this effect monotonically
decreases with maturity of CDS contracts. Moreover, this effect is robust to earnings
surprises, management guidance, special firm-specific events, and alternative proxies of
uncertainty. Overall, the results imply that the tone of accounting disclosures provides
valuable, incremental information to the CDS markets.
The third essay studies whether the type of organizational structure in mutual
funds affects the likelihood of window dressing. Using U.S. equity mutual fund data, I
find that, conditional on inferior performance, team-managed funds have lower levels of
window dressing and deceive significantly less than single-managed funds. The negative
relation between team-managed funds and window dressing is not driven by various fund
characteristics that differ between single- and team-managed funds. This relation is
especially significant when other forms of fund governance mechanisms are low. Thus,
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the findings support the notion that the team form of organization helps reduce the
incentive to deceive.

Keywords
Mutual Funds; Corporate Social Responsibility; Window Dressing; Organizational
Structure; Deception; Textual Analysis; Default Risk; Uncertainty, Tone; Accounting
Disclosure
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction
The thesis includes three essays (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4) in various

areas in empirical finance covering mutual funds, corporate social responsibility, and the
impact of uncertainty in financial statements.
The first essay explores the impact of mutual fund ownership on the corporate
social responsibility (CSR) commitments of their holding firms. The literature on the role
of CSR falls either into the value maximization view (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2007;
Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013) or into the agency problem view (Jensen,
2001; Masulis and Reza, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Therefore, a CSR-friendly
shareholder (one who believes in the value maximization view) would support increasing
CSR spending and a CSR-unfriendly investor (one who believes in the agency view)
would support decreasing CSR spending. The essay specifically investigates whether
increases in CSR-friendly ownership result in increases in the CSR commitments of a
firm, and subsequently, if CSR-unfriendly ownership results in decreases in the CSR
commitments of a firm.
I calculate a holdings-based, value-weighted CSR score for every mutual fund in
a year and identify them as CSR-friendly (CSR-unfriendly) if it belongs to the top
(bottom) tercile for three consecutive years. Subsequently, I calculate the total amount of
CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year. I find that increases
in CSR-friendly ownership in a firm are positively associated with future increases in the
CSR of the firm. Likewise, I also find that increases in CSR-unfriendly ownership are
negatively associated with future changes in the CSR of the firm. Furthermore, I find that
the influence of CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly ownership depends on the firm’s
current level of CSR. When a firm’s CSR commitments are below average, CSR-friendly
ownership has a larger positive impact on CSR and CSR-unfriendly investors have a
smaller negative impact on the CSR of the firm. This pattern holds when examining their
impact on the CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses of a firm separately. CSR-friendly
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ownership increases the CSR strengths and reduces the CSR weaknesses of a firm. CSRunfriendly ownership reduces the CSR strengths of a firm, but also reduces the CSR
weaknesses of a firm, albeit not statistically significant at conventional levels. This shows
that even CSR-unfriendly investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose
implementing some CSR reforms.
Chapter 3 examines the role of linguistic tone of accounting disclosures in the
pricing of Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts. In credit markets, researchers use a
variety of accounting variables such as financial ratios, earnings, management forecasts,
and analyst reports to price credit securities such as CDS. Little attention is given to the
impact of qualitative or “soft” information, such as linguistic tone, in these accounting
disclosures on CDS spreads. The essay investigates whether 10-Q/K filings with higher
proportions of uncertain words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible) affect
investors’ beliefs about the firm’s default risk as captured by CDS spreads. The uncertain
word list from the dictionaries developed by Loughran and McDonald, (2011) is used to
measure disclosure tone. We argue that the tone of 10-Q/K filings reflects the
management’s confidence in the firm’s business strategy, competitive position within the
industry, and future financial wellbeing. Any uncertainty expressed through the tone of
these disclosures should influence investors’ evaluations of the firm’s future value.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher the usage of uncertain words in these
disclosures, the greater the uncertainty in investors’ beliefs about the firm’s value and
thus, the higher the CDS spreads. We also investigate the impact of uncertain disclosure
tone on the term structure of CDS spreads across maturities. Duffie and Lando, (2001)
predict that firms with “noisy” accounting reports have significantly higher credit spreads
at shorter maturities compared to longer maturities. Therefore, we postulate that the effect
of disclosure uncertainty varies across the term structure of credit spreads, with relatively
higher impact for shorter maturities.
The empirical results in Chapter 3 show a positive relation between uncertain
disclosure tone and changes in CDS spreads. Firms with greater uncertainty in the tone of
10-Q/K disclosure experience a significant increase in their CDS spreads following the
public disclosure. We find that one standard deviation increase in uncertain tone
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increases the CDS spreads by 1.4 basis points (bps) relative to the mean change across all
firms of around 0.47 bps. Our finding is robust to controlling for equity returns, market
volatility, spot rate, aggregate default, and term premium. Consistent with Duffie and
Lando, (2001), we also find that CDS spreads with short-term maturities have greater
sensitivity to uncertain tone than long-term maturities. In fact, uncertain tone sensitivities
decline monotonically with maturity. This finding suggests that disclosure tone contains
useful default risk information for investors in valuation of CDS contracts, particularly
with short-term maturity.
In Chapter 4, I study the effect of organizational structure of mutual funds on an
important agency problem in mutual funds— “window dressing.” Window dressing is a
form of portfolio manipulation where some managers sell poorly performing stocks and
buy stocks that performed well over the reporting period to hide their true managerial
ability from investors (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991; Agarwal, Gay,
and Ling, 2014; Meier and Schaumburg, 2004). This practice is looked upon
unfavourably as it affects portfolio value through unnecessary trading costs and
potentially priming the portfolio for lower future returns. Prior research shows that teammanaged organizations can lower the inclination to engage in deceptive behaviour
(Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and teams increase the cost of
deception by greater peer monitoring, higher guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006), and by dividing the output among several members (Acemoglu, Kremer, and
Mian, 2008). In this essay, I particularly look at whether team-managed funds (mutual
funds with two or more fund managers) window dress less than single-managed funds
(mutual funds with only one fund manager) when they have inferior performance.
The results of Chapter 4 show that, conditional on inferior performance, teammanaged funds window dress less by almost 20 basis points per quarter when compared
to single-managed funds. These differences are highly significant. I also investigate the
circumstances under which team-managed funds are effective in curtailing deceptive
behaviour. Larger fund families tend to have more resources and better internal
governance mechanisms (Khoranna, 1996). Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) also show that
the career concerns and incentives differ vastly among more experienced, older managers
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vs younger managers and that more experienced managers are more likely to engage in
deceptive behaviour. Thus, I postulate that team-managed funds will have a greater
impact in reducing window dressing among smaller fund families and also among older,
more experienced managers. I find exactly this result, as team-managed funds do not
differ from single-managed funds in the levels of window dressing among large fund
families. However, among smaller fund families where internal governance mechanisms
are weaker, team-managed funds window dress less when compared to single-managed
funds. I also find that team-managed funds window dress considerably less than their
single-managed counterparts among older, more experienced managers. Overall, the
findings from this chapter show different situations where managerial structure is very
effective in curtailing window dressing behaviour in the mutual fund industry.
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Chapter 2

2

Do Mutual Funds Affect Corporate Social
Responsibility?
2.1

Introduction

Investment funds incorporating social criteria have enjoyed tremendous growth
over the past two decades. The U.S. Social Investment Forum (USSIF) reports that assets
managed using environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues totalled $6.57 trillion
at the start of 2014. Investment companies respond to this demand by pivoting some of
their existing funds to incorporate ESG criteria and by introducing new mutual funds
with ESG criteria. Despite such growth in socially responsible investments, it is unclear
to what extent these funds, along with other shareholders, have the capability or interest
to influence the corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments of their holding firms
and this essay investigates exactly that.1
The literature on the role of CSR in corporations can be broadly classified into
two views. The first view argues that CSR is in line with value maximization (Besley and
Ghatak, 2007; Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). The second view is that CSR
is a manifestation of agency problems inside a firm and benefits the managers at the
expense of the shareholders (Masulis and Reza, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010).
Additionally, managers who are engaged in CSR can lose focus on their primary
responsibility of operating the firm (Jensen, 2001). So, according to the agency view,
firms should not engage in CSR, as it is not in the interest of shareholders. The views of
institutional owners and shareholders on the role of CSR can fall into either the value
maximization view (CSR-friendly) or the agency cost view (CSR-unfriendly). Therefore,
a CSR-friendly shareholder would support increasing CSR spending and a CSRunfriendly shareholder would support decreasing CSR spending. This essay specifically

1

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in this paper refers to the Environmental and Social issues and does
not include the traditional Governance issues.

8

investigates whether increases in CSR-friendly ownership result in increases in the CSR
commitments of a firm, and subsequently, if CSR-unfriendly ownership results in
decreases in the CSR commitments of a firm.
The research questions above are examined using a sample of actively managed
U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. I focus on actively managed mutual funds, as they
can be classified as CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly by observing their detailed
holdings data. Active mutual funds do not have to keep holding on to a stock if it has a
very high or low CSR. They can add or drop a stock from their portfolio at any point in
time. Even though passive indexed funds can influence CSR, they cannot add or drop a
stock from their portfolio as they please. This makes it difficult to infer from their
holdings if they are CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly. The mutual fund holding data from
Morningstar are combined with firm-level CSR data from the MSCI ESG KLD database
from WRDS. This enables me to calculate a Mutual Fund CSR score (MFCSR), which is
the value-weighted average of the CSR ratings (total CSR strengths less total CSR
concerns) of all the stocks held by the mutual fund at the end of the year.2 Using a
holdings-based measure allows for the inclusion of all mutual funds instead of focusing
only on a small sample of self-declared socially responsible funds (SRI). Using this
measure, I identify a mutual fund as CSR-friendly (CSR-unfriendly) if it belongs to the
top (bottom) tercile for three consecutive years.3 Subsequently, I calculate the total
amount of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year.
Using a sample of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations, I find
that increases in CSR-friendly ownership in a firm are positively associated with future
increases in the CSR commitments of the firm. Likewise, I find that increases in CSRunfriendly ownership are negatively associated with future changes in the CSR of the
firm. I also find that the influence of CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly ownership depends

2
3

Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst, (2015) and El Ghoul and Karoui, (2017) use similar measures.

Classifying CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly funds based on top and bottom quintiles do not
qualitatively change the results.
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on the firm’s current level of CSR. When a firm’s CSR commitments are below average,
CSR-friendly ownership has a larger positive impact and CSR-unfriendly investors have
a smaller negative impact on the CSR of the firm. Furthermore, I find that CSR-friendly
ownership increases the CSR strengths and reduces the CSR weaknesses of a firm. CSRunfriendly ownership reduces the CSR strengths of a firm, but also reduces the CSR
weaknesses of a firm, albeit not statistically significant at conventional levels. This shows
that even CSR-unfriendly investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose
implementing some CSR reforms.
I also show a direct mechanism through which CSR-friendly ownership and CSRunfriendly ownership can affect the CSR of a firm. Previous research shows that under
certain circumstances, CSR-contingent compensation to executives can constitute optimal
contracting (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan,
1997). I find that firms with higher CSR-friendly (unfriendly) ownership are positively
(negatively) associated with having executive compensation linked to CSR-related
outcomes. Other alternative explanations, such as corporate governance and managerial
incentives that may explain the results, are also ruled out. Jo and Harjoto, (2012) show
that corporate governance is positively associated with the CSR of a firm. I add two
governance variables to the regression: board size and percentage of independent
directors, which reflect the effectiveness of board governance. I find that CSR-friendly
and CSR-unfriendly ownership still have an influence on CSR beyond that explained by
changes in governance. Prior studies also examine the relationship between executive
compensation incentives and CSR, but the results are inconclusive (Mahoney and
Thorne, 2005; Berrone, Makri, and Gomez-Mejia, 2008). I add two variables related to
executive compensation: the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in stock price
(CEO delta) and the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in stock return volatility
(CEO vega). However, the effect of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership on the
future CSR of the firm remains the same.
The essay contributes to the growing literature on the role of investors on the
corporate social responsibility of a firm. Dimson, Karakaş, and Li, (2015) use private
institutional data and show how private engagements can be used to improve CSR. Dyck,
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Lins, Roth, and Wagner, (2016) use international data and show that institutional
ownership originating from countries with higher social norms are positively associated
with a firm’s CSR performance. In this essay, I make four important contributions: This
is one of the first essays to classify mutual fund shareholder ownership in a firm as CSRfriendly and CSR-unfriendly. Second, I show that the changes in CSR-friendly and CSRunfriendly ownership are important determinants of a firm’s CSR and that responsible
funds influence them in a positive way. Third, I show that CSR-friendly and CSRunfriendly ownership affect the likelihood of executives’ compensations being contracted
on CSR. Finally, I show that the support and opposition to CSR from the shareholders are
very dependent on the firm’s current level of CSR and are very different for CSR
strengths and CSR weaknesses.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe the sample and the
variables used in all the tests. Section 2.4 presents the results of the regressions between
CSR-friendly mutual fund ownership and a firm’s CSR commitments, and Section 2.5
concludes.

2.2
2.2.1

Prior Research and Hypotheses Development
Corporate Social Responsibility, Responsible Investing, and
Firm Value

A large number of literature explores the link between responsible investing and
fund performance. While some studies show a positive relationship (Barnett and
Salomon, 2006), and others show a negative relationship (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009;
Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst, 2015), the majority of studies finds no significant
differences between responsible funds and conventional funds (Renneboog, Ter Horst,
and Zhang, 2008). On the link between CSR and firm value, Bénabou and Tirole, (2010)
summarize the literature and offer two views. The first view argues that CSR is in line
with value maximization as it enables the management to take a long-term perspective
(Edmans, 2011). This view also states that by implementing CSR, firms can increase
product differentiation, build reputation, increase customer loyalty, and premium pricing
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(Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). The second view is that CSR is a
manifestation of agency problems inside a firm and is value-destroying (Masulis and
Reza, 2015); Freidman, 1970).4

2.2.2

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility
The effect of institutional ownership on corporate governance is well-

documented. Higher institutional ownership is positively associated with better
governance. Examples from the literature include Agrawal and Mandelker, (1992); Del
Guercio and Hawkins, (1999); Gillan and Starks, (2000); and Hartzell and Starks, (2003).
This monitoring effect is achieved by two methods: voicing opinions and the threat of
exit. In the first method, the investor chooses to engage with the firm by having meetings,
discussions, and phone calls with the firm’s executives (Goldstein, 2011, 2014) or by
introducing shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Dissatisfied shareholders
can also use the exit option and express their opinions by selling company shares. For
example, Parrino, Sias, and Starks, (2003) show that large sell-offs by institutional
investors increase the probability of the CEO being replaced. The influence of the
institutional investors on environmental and social issues also happens in similar ways to
corporate governance; however, there is limited research in this area. Dimson, Karakaş,
and Li, (2015) use data from a large, institutional investor and examine engagements
related to CSR issues. They find that CSR activism increases shareholder value when the
engagements are successful and does not decrease shareholder value when unsuccessful.
Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner, (2016) use international data and show that institutional
ownership originating from countries with higher social norms are positively associated
with a firm’s CSR performance.

4

Bénabou and Tirole, (2010) also specify a third view where firms use CSR as an efficient channel to
express their values on behalf of the stakeholders. This view can be argued to be in line with value
maximization as it can result in higher motivation among employees, lower turnover, and higher reputation.
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2.2.3

Hypotheses Development
This essay contributes to the existing literature by using a panel data of firms and

examining the impact of certain types of institutional ownership on the CSR performance
of their holding firms. Instead of looking at the overall level of institutional ownership or
mutual fund ownership, I look at both the levels and changes in CSR-friendly and CSRunfriendly mutual fund ownership in a firm. At first glance, it seems obvious that CSRfriendly ownership will positively influence the holdings of their firms, but this need not
be the case. Literature shows that socially conscious investors have longer investment
horizons and are willing to accept lower financial performance (Riedl and Smeets, 2017);
and that fund outflows in socially responsible funds are less sensitive to performance
compared to conventional funds (Benson, Brailsford, and Humphrey, 2006; Renneboog,
Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2011). Also, as consumers and investors become more socially
responsible, investment firms introduce new fund types to generate subsequent capital
inflows and incremental revenue. In short, investment firms can use CSR as an
advertising tool to attract socially conscious investors. This leads to the first two
hypotheses.
H1a: CSR-friendly ownership has a positive influence on a firm’s future CSR.
H1b: CSR-unfriendly ownership has a negative influence on a firm’s future CSR.
The influence of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership on firms also
depends on the firm’s current level of CSR. If a firm has poor CSR compared to its peers,
then it can lead to higher turnover, lower customer satisfaction, and can face a loss of
reputation (Kotchen and Moon, 2012). In these scenarios, the firm is more likely to face
pressure from CSR-friendly shareholders to increase CSR. CSR-unfriendly shareholders
are also less likely to oppose CSR spending, as the benefits of CSR spending are more
visible and CSR projects are more likely to have positive net present value. Whereas, if a
firm already has good CSR, then CSR-unfriendly shareholders are more likely to oppose
CSR spending, as the benefits of CSR are less visible. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014)
show that companies with better stakeholder relations also have higher selling, general,
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and administrative expenses and that firms do not recover these expenditures through
increases in sales. Krüger, (2015) finds that investors react negatively to the arrival of
negative CSR news, and slightly negatively to the release of positive CSR news. This
shows that there are significant costs associated with social irresponsibility, but
unconditionally, investors do not appreciate the implementation of CSR policies. This
leads to the next two hypotheses.
H2a: The positive effect of CSR-friendly mutual funds is higher in firms with poor CSR.
H2b: The negative effect of CSR-unfriendly mutual funds is higher in firms with good
CSR.

2.3
2.3.1

Data, Summary Statistics, and Methodology
Measure of CSR, MFCSR, and Other Variables

The CSR rating of a firm is obtained from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database
(henceforth KLD). KLD’s database includes more than 650 companies from 1991 and
more than 3,000 companies comprised of the Russell 3000 index since 2003. Analysts
from KLD use publicly available information, company filings, government data, nongovernmental organization data, and media sources and single out relevant information to
measure a firm’s environmental, social, and governance performance (ESG). Each firm is
evaluated on a set of strengths and weaknesses in each of the following dimensions:
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product
safety.5 If a firm performs a good (bad) deed deemed by KLD, it gains one point in
strengths (weaknesses). I calculate the overall CSR rating for a firm as the sum of the
total number of strengths less the total number of concerns across all categories.6

5

KLD also evaluates a firm on corporate governance. As the focus of this paper is strictly on the role of
mutual fund on CSR, I exclude the corporate governance measure when calculating the CSR score.
6

The simple KLD score can have a drawback as it is not possible to compare scores across time as the
number of strengths and concerns vary considerably every year. All our regressions use time fixed effects
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The data on mutual funds come from Morningstar Direct and cover all actively
managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1996 to 2012. The sample used
includes funds that belong to the following investment objectives: aggressive growth,
growth, growth and income, and equity income. The sample excludes sector,
international, balanced, and index funds from the analysis. The data on firm-specific
variables such as firm size, return on assets (ROA), leverage, market-to-book ratio (M/B),
research and development (R&D) spending, and advertising expenses are obtained from
COMPUSTAT. These control variables have been shown to be important determinants of
corporate social performance (Hong, Li, and Minor, 2016; Yermack, 2009). For example,
larger firms are expected to engage in more CSR spending and return on assets is also
very likely correlated with CSR spending, as less profitable firms are less likely to
engage in CSR (Masulis and Reza, 2015). Similarly, CSR can be viewed as a form of
advertising and controlling for it is important (Campbell, 2007). Appendix 2-1 lists the
definitions and measurement of all variables.

2.3.2

CSR-Friendly Ownership and CSR-Unfriendly Ownership
I identify a mutual fund as CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly based on its mutual

fund level CSR score (MFCSR). To construct a mutual fund level CSR score, I first
match the annual data from Morningstar Direct to the CSR scores of firms from KLD.
Some stocks are not assigned a rating by KLD. To address this problem, I follow
Cremers and Petajisto, (2009) and El Ghoul and Karoui, (2017) and require that the sum
of the equity weights with a CSR rating accounts for at least 67% of the portfolio. For a
more complete and reliable dataset, I exclude a fund if it holds less than 10 firms in its
portfolio and has total net assets of less than $5 million (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng,
2008). The MFCSR score is calculated as the value-weighted average of the CSR ratings
of all the stocks held by the mutual fund at the end of the year. I then sort all mutual

to address this problem. I also use adjusted CSR scores similar to Deng, Kang and Low (2013) and find
similar results.
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funds each year according to its MFCSR score every year and classify them as CSRfriendly if they belong to the top tercile for three consecutive years.7 Similarly, a mutual
fund is classified as CSR-unfriendly if it belongs to the bottom tercile for three
consecutive years.8 Finally, each year, I compute the total percentage of CSR-friendly
and CSR-unfriendly mutual fund ownership in a firm.
The final combined sample consists of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year
observations from 1996 to 2012. The book leverage of a firm is capped between 0 and 1.
To remove the effect of extremely small firms, I remove a firm from the sample if it has a
market capitalization of less than $5 million USD. I also winsorize all variables at 1%
and 99% levels to reduce the effect of outliers. Table 2-1 presents the Fama-French 48
industry and year distributions for the whole sample.

2.4
2.4.1

Results
Descriptive Statistics

Panel A of Table 2-2 presents the summary statistics of all the firm-year
observations in the sample. The average firm in a year has a CSR rating of less than zero.
This shows that the average firm has more concerns than strengths across its six CSR
categories. The total mutual fund ownership in a firm is 10.95%, which is sub-classified
into CSR-friendly ownership of 0.77% and CSR-unfriendly ownership of 4.89%. The rest
of the mutual fund ownership is unclassified. Ownership by self-declared SRI funds
amounts to a very small 0.18%. The rest of the variables are firm controls and the average
value of: return on assets is 2.0%; log(Sales) is 6.914; book leverage is .222; market-tobook ratio is 1.51; research and development expenses are 4% of total assets; and
advertising expenses are 1.2% of total assets.

7

As a robustness measure, I also sort funds each year within its style (objective) category to avoid potential
correlations between fund style and MFCSR.
8

Many funds happen to have a high MFCSR score in one year and normal or low MFCSR score in another
year. I look at three years of information to avoid misclassifying such funds.
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2.4.2

Correlations and Cross-sectional Regressions
Panel B of Table 2-2 presents the correlation table. As hypothesized, the total

mutual fund ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership are negatively related to the CSR
ratings of a firm, but the CSR-friendly ownership is positively related to the CSR ratings
of a firm. The sign of correlation for the rest of the control variables is as expected: ROA,
size, M/B ratio, R&D, and advertising are all positively correlated with CSR and leverage
is negatively correlated with CSR. However, correlations do not control for firm-specific
characteristics and therefore, I conduct numerous multivariate analyses in the next
sections. Table 2-3 shows the results of a population averaged cross-sectional regression.
After controlling for firm-specific characteristics, firms with higher CSR ratings are
positively associated with CSR-friendly ownership and firms with lower CSR ratings are
positively associated with CSR-unfriendly ownership. Total mutual fund ownership is
negatively associated with the CSR rating of a firm.

2.4.3

Fixed Effect Regressions and Change Regressions
The previous cross-sectional regression results do not tell us if CSR-friendly or

CSR-unfriendly ownership has any influence on its holding firms. I run the following
panel data fixed effect regression:
𝑪𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒕 + 𝜼𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝒊 + 𝜸𝒕 + 𝝐𝒊𝒕

(𝟐. 𝟏)

where the dependent variable is the CSR rating in the following year and the variable of
interest is the type of ownership, which can be either overall mutual fund ownership,
CSR-friendly ownership, or CSR-unfriendly ownership depending on the specification.
The firm fixed effect is 𝛿𝑖 and the year fixed effect 𝛾𝑡 is added to ensure that the
estimates are not driven by an upward trend in the increase of CSR across all firms. The
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table 2-4 shows the results of the fixed effects regression. CSR-friendly
ownership is positively and significantly related to a firm’s future CSR and CSRunfriendly ownership is negatively and significantly related to a firm’s future CSR. The
results also show how the heterogeneity of “CSR friendliness” among mutual funds
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affects its holding firms’ CSR. Even though the coefficients from the fixed effects
regression are very significant, the CSR ratings of firms could potentially be serially
correlated over time and reverse causality cannot be ruled out. I conduct first difference
(change) regressions to check how changes in CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly
ownership lead to changes in CSR ratings in the following year. Apart from running the
regression for the full sample, I also split the data into two subsamples: one where the
CSR rating of the firm is below the median and one where the CSR rating of the firm is
above the median. The regression specification is as below.
𝛥𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑡 + 𝜂𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(2.2)

where the variables are the same as in equation 2.1 except that both the left-hand side and
the right-hand side variables reflect the change from the previous year. In this equation,
𝛿𝑖 represents the industry fixed effect. Table 2-5 shows the results of the above regression
specification. In all the regressions, the change in CSR-friendly ownership has a positive
and significant relation with the change in a firm’s future CSR, and the change in CSRunfriendly ownership has a negative and significant relation with the change in a firm’s
future CSR. As expected in hypotheses 2, the coefficient on the change in CSR-friendly
ownership is larger when the firm’s CSR is poor (below median). Similarly, the
coefficient on the change in CSR-unfriendly ownership is larger when the firm’s CSR is
good (above median). These results show that the influence of CSR-friendly ownership is
stronger when the firm has poor CSR. Even shareholders who do not have favourable
opinions of CSR do not oppose CSR very strongly when the firm’s CSR is poor relative
to when the firm’s CSR is good.

2.4.4

Likelihood of Firm Offering CSR-Linked Compensation
One channel through which shareholder ownership can influence the CSR of a

firm is by linking executive compensation to CSR improvements. Academic research
shows that under certain circumstances, CSR-contingent compensation to executives can
constitute optimal contracting (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Ittner,
Larcker, and Rajan, 1997). However, critics of CSR contracts argue that they could create
perverse incentives and that CSR benchmarks are easy to manipulate and difficult to
verify. So, I postulate that firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are more likely to
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have executives with CSR-contingent compensation and that firms with higher CSRunfriendly ownership are less likely to have executives with CSR-contingent
compensation.
I identify the S&P 500 companies from 2009–2013 and examine their proxy
statements for each year. In going through these statements, I note whether executives
were offered any compensation contingent on measures such as “safety,” “pollution,”
“customer satisfaction,” “social responsibility,” etc. Specifically, to code the
compensation as CSR-linked, I use a collection of keywords based on guidance from a
sustainability consulting firm.9 I differentiate between firms that grant a CSR-contingent
compensation contract and those that do not by using a dummy variable CSR Contract
Dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the firm’s proxy statement indicates that one or more
of its executive’s pay is tied to achievement of CSR-related outcomes, 0 otherwise.
Table 2-6 presents the results of a population averaged-logistic regression. The
overall level of mutual fund ownership is negatively related and almost statistically
significant at the 10% level, to the likelihood of firms offering CSR-linked compensation.
The level of CSR-unfriendly ownership negatively relates to the likelihood of CSRlinked compensation and the coefficient is statistically very significant. Ikram, Li, and
Minor, (2018) also show that socially responsible firms are more likely to have CSRlinked compensation contracts. To capture this effect, I run a regression where I interact
CSR-friendly ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership with the current level of CSR
rating. The interaction term of CSR F-own X CSR Rating is not significant, but the
interaction term of CSR UF-own X CSR Rating is negative and significant. This shows
that when CSR-unfriendly ownership is high, and the current CSR level of a firm is high,
the firm is very unlikely to have executive compensation linked to CSR. CSR-friendly
ownership, however, is not significantly associated with CSR Contract Dummy in any of
the regression specifications.

9

The complete collection of keywords is listed in Appendix 2-2.
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2.4.5

CSR Strengths and Weaknesses
In many cases, CSR-related expenditure can be interpreted to mitigate the

problems and negative publicity associated with social costs. If the social costs are large,
it can be advantageous for companies to anticipate social pressure and reduce conflict by
investing in CSR-related activities (Heal, 2005). Many papers have shown that firms
invest in CSR-related activities to mitigate harm from certain other CSR weaknesses
(Kotchen and Moon, 2012; Mueller and Kraussl, 2011). For the above reasons, I test if
CSR-friendly ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership differ in their impact on CSR
strengths and CSR weaknesses separately instead of combining them into a single index.
Table 2-7 presents the results of the regression. For CSR strengths, the results are
qualitatively similar to Table 2-5. Total mutual fund ownership and CSR-unfriendly
ownership are negatively related to future CSR strengths and CSR-friendly ownership is
positively related to future CSR strengths. However, both CSR-friendly ownership and
CSR-unfriendly ownership reduce the future CSR weaknesses of a firm. Although not
statistically significant at conventional levels, this shows that even CSR-unfriendly
investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose implementing some CSR
reforms.

2.4.6

Corporate Governance and Executive Incentives
Hong, Li, and Minor, (2016) and Jo and Harjoto, (2012) show that corporate

governance improvements have an influence on the CSR ratings of firms. I use two
variables to proxy for improvements in corporate governance: change in board size and
change in percentage of independent directors.10 The data for board size and board
independence are obtained from COMPUSTAT. These variables are added to the same
regression specification as equation 2.2. Table 2-8 presents the results of the regression
with these additional controls. The coefficient on change in board size is not significant
and the coefficients on change in percentage of independent directors is significant at the

10

In unreported results, I also use changes in governance index (G-index) created by Gompers and Meshi
(2006) from 2003–2006 and find qualitatively similar results.
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10% level only in the full sample. The coefficients on CSR-friendly ownership and CSRunfriendly ownership are very similar to Table 2-5 and influence the future changes in the
CSR of a firm even after controlling for corporate governance.
Another explanation for the changes in CSR could be due to changes in CEO
incentives (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; (Coles and Li, 2012). I use two variables from the
Execucomp database to control for CEO’s incentives: CEO delta (sensitivity of CEO’s
wealth to changes in stock price) and CEO vega (sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes
in stock return volatility). The changes in CEO delta and CEO vega are added as controls
to equation 2.2. None of the coefficients are significantly related to the future change in
CSR.

2.5

Conclusion

Responsible investments have grown tremendously over the past decade and
shareholders are increasingly paying attention to the CSR commitments of the firm. As
different shareholders have different views on CSR, it is important to know the extent to
which shareholders influence the CSR policies of a firm.
In this essay, I study a sample of all equity domestic U.S. mutual funds and
employ a novel procedure of measuring CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly mutual fund
ownership in a firm every year. I conduct a series of tests to see if they have any
influence on the future CSR of a firm. The results also show that CSR-friendly and CSRunfriendly ownership are important determinants of a firm’s CSR. Further investigation
has revealed that CSR-friendly ownership is associated with future increases in CSR
strengths and future decreases in CSR weaknesses of a firm. Likewise, CSR-unfriendly
ownership is associated with future decreases in CSR strengths, but has no effect on the
future CSR weaknesses of a firm. The study also shows a direct channel through which
mutual funds can affect the CSR of a firm. Firms with higher CSR-unfriendly ownership
are less likely to have executive compensation contracts linked to social performance.
Overall, the results show that the CSR policies of a firm are dependent on the
composition of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly shareholder ownership.
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Table 2-1: Sample Distribution by Industry and Year
Panel A. Sample Distribution by Industry
#
FF48 Industry Description
Number of Firms
%
1
Agriculture
59
0.27
2
Aircraft
174
0.80
3
Apparel
308
1.41
4
Automobiles and Trucks
359
1.64
5
Banking
479
2.19
6
Beer and Liquor
75
0.34
7
Business Services
2,597
11.89
8
Business Supplies
338
1.55
9
Candy and Soda
63
0.29
10
Chemicals
612
2.80
11
Coal
86
0.39
12
Computers
869
3.98
13
Construction
322
1.47
14
Consumer Goods
399
1.83
15
Construction Materials
413
1.89
16
Defence
60
0.27
17
Electrical Equipment
310
1.42
18
Electronic Equipment
1,467
6.71
19
Entertainment
316
1.45
20
Fabricated Products
17
0.08
21
Food Products
393
1.80
22
Healthcare
380
1.74
23
Insurance
305
1.40
24
Machinery
936
4.28
25
Measuring and Control Equipment
483
2.21
26
Medical Equipment
643
2.94
27
Mining
99
0.45
28
Other
302
1.38
29
Personal Services
308
1.41
30
Petroleum and Natural Gas
1,017
4.65
31
Pharmaceutical Products
1,347
6.17
32
Precious Metals
59
0.27
33
Printing and Publishing
217
0.99
34
Real Estate
15
0.07
35
Recreation
129
0.59
36
Restaurants, Hotels and Motels
399
1.83
37
Retail
1,469
6.72
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38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Rubber and Plastic Products
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment
Shipping Containers
Steel Works
Telecommunication
Textiles
Tobacco
Trading
Transportation
Utilities
Wholesale
Total
Panel B. Sample Distribution by Year
Year

Number
of Firms

%

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

300
334
334
375
336
707
727
1397
2043
1830
1859
1840
1910
1940
2036
1945
1936
21,849

1.37
1.53
1.53
1.72
1.54
3.24
3.33
6.39
9.35
8.38
8.51
8.42
8.74
8.88
9.32
8.90
8.86
100

108
65
93
304
793
60
50
335
657
943
617
21,849

0.49
0.30
0.43
1.39
3.63
0.27
0.23
1.53
3.01
4.32
2.82
100

This table presents the Fama-French 48 industry and year distributions for the initial
sample of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations.
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
CSR Rating
MF own (%)
CSR F-own (%)
CSR UF-own (%)
SR own (%)
ROA
Sales(Log)
Book Leverage
M/B Ratio
R&D
Advertising

N
Mean Median SD
Min
Max
21,849 -0.202 0.000 2.281 -9.000 18.000
21,849 10.948 9.749 8.309 0.042 35.548
21,849 0.773
0.015 1.721 0.000 9.145
21,849 4.895
2.415 5.924 0.000 25.463
21,849 0.183
0.008 0.571 0.000 3.743
21,849 0.020
0.043 0.143 -0.717 0.292
21,849 6.914
6.894 1.811 0.000 13.055
21,849 0.222
0.194 0.206 0.000 0.929
21,849 1.510
1.072 1.412 0.077 7.725
21,849 0.040
0.000 0.077 0.000 0.454
21,849 0.012
0.000 0.031 0.000 0.191

Panel sample consists of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2012. Firmlevel data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This
sample is matched with the MSCI ESG KLD stats database. CSR rating of a firm is defined as the #number
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, human rights, and product. MF own is the total mutual fund ownership in a firm. CSR F-own
is the mutual fund ownership held by CSR-friendly mutual funds. CSR UF-own is the mutual fund
ownership held by CSR-unfriendly mutual funds. SR own is the mutual fund ownership held by selfdeclared Socially Responsible Funds. ROA is Return on Assets. Size is the logarithm of the Sales. Book
Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of equity and is capped between 0 and 1.
M/B is the market value of the firm scaled by total assets. R&D is the Research and Development expenses
scaled by total assets. Advertising is the Advertising expenses scaled by total assets. A firm is removed
from the sample if its market capitalization is less than $10 million.
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Panel B: Correlation Table
CSR

CSR
MF own
CSR F-own
CSR UF-own
SR own
ROA
Size
Leverage
M/B
R&D
Advertising

1
-0.0243
0.2346
-0.2088
.1005
0.0724
0.1772
-0.0436
0.0998
0.0466
0.1067

MF own CSR F-own CSR UF-own SR own

1
.2672
0.6497
.0548
.1494
.0392
.1024
.0662
-.0644
0.0016

1
-.2556
.2135
.0939
.3385
-.0316
.1383
.0458
.0271

1
-.1491
.0595
-.2629
-.1176
-.0735
-.0771
-0.0102

1
.0677
.2785
.0691
-.0387
-.0732
0.0107

ROA

Size

1
.3268
1
-.1239 .2254
.0847 -.2830
-.4653 -.4263
.0815 .0698

Leverage

1
-.3468
-.2040
-.0191

M/B

R&D

1
.3868
1
.1240 -.0746
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Table 2-3: Cross-Sectional Regression of Mutual Fund Ownership on CSR
Dependent Variable:
MF own

1
-1.377***
(0.000)

CSR F-own

CSR Scoret
2
3

26.285***
(0.000)

CSR UF-own
ROA
Sales(Log)
Book Leverage
M/B Ratio
R&D
Advertising
Adjusted R-square
N

-0.025
(0.920)
0.377***
(0.000)
-0.366**
(0.015)
0.167***
(0.000)
2.274***
(0.000)
3.111***
(0.002)
0.165
21,637

-0.120
(0.626)
0.283***
(0.000)
-0.281*
(0.059)
0.114***
(0.000)
1.847***
(0.000)
3.473***
(0.000)
0.184
21,637

4

24.768***
(0.000)
-3.794*** -3.318***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.041
0.035
(0.869)
(0.889)
0.346*** 0.264***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.391*** -0.314**
(0.009)
(0.034)
0.150*** 0.107***
(0.000)
(0.000)
2.030*** 1.627***
(0.000)
(0.001)
3.211*** 3.443***
(0.001)
(0.000)
0.173
0.192
21,637
21,637

The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on mutual fund ownership. The panel
data is population-averaged before running the regression. Firm-level data are obtained from
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI
ESG KLD stats database. The dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, human rights, and product. All independent variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99th
percentile. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2-4: Does Mutual Fund Ownership Influence CSR? - Evidence from Fixed
Effects Regression
Dependent Variable:
MF own

1
-1.997***
(0.000)

CSR F-own

CSR Scoret+1
2
3

12.296***
(0.000)

CSR UF-own
ROA
Sales(Log)
Book Leverage
M/B Ratio
R&D
Advertising
Year Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-square
N

0.424**
(0.014)
-0.057
(0.360)
0.013
(0.945)
0.002
(0.923)
-1.117*
(0.069)
-3.287
(0.116)
Yes
Yes
0.620
18,224

0.451***
(0.008)
-0.122**
(0.049)
0.085
(0.651)
-0.021
(0.355)
-0.863
(0.146)
-3.331
(0.108)
Yes
Yes
0.623
18,224

4

11.032***
(0.000)
-4.218*** -3.724***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.416**
0.454***
(0.016)
(0.007)
-0.085
-0.120*
(0.169)
(0.050)
0.013
0.055
(0.946)
(0.768)
-0.003
-0.015
(0.891)
(0.516)
-1.080*
-0.956
(0.077)
(0.105)
-3.355
-3.310
(0.103)
(0.101)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.623
0.626
18,224
18,224

The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on lagged mutual fund ownership with
firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-level data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI ESG KLD stats database. The
dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number of strengths - #number of
weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights,
and product. All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All independent
variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1 st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2-5: Does Mutual Fund Ownership Influence CSR? - Evidence from Change
Regressions
Dependent Variable:

∆CSR F-own
∆CSR UF-own
∆ROA
∆Sales(Log)
∆Book Leverage
∆M/B Ratio
∆R&D
∆Advertising
Industry Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2
N

CSR Score Below
Median
1
3.498***
(0.002)
-1.417***
(0.000)
0.134
(0.284)
0.003
(0.957)
-0.030
(0.864)
0.001
(0.956)
-0.351
(0.487)
-0.446
(0.665)
Yes
0.060
7,110

∆CSR Scoret+1
CSR Score Above
Median
2
3.133***
(0.003)
-1.688***
(0.000)
-0.230
(0.196)
0.141**
(0.032)
0.095
(0.595)
-0.055***
(0.002)
-0.665
(0.213)
-1.941
(0.174)
Yes
0.044
6,980

Full
Sample
3
2.805***
(0.001)
-0.725***
(0.000)
-0.077
(0.477)
0.062
(0.181)
0.046
(0.713)
-0.038***
(0.004)
-0.390
(0.292)
-0.721
(0.434)
Yes
0.039
14,090

The table reports results from regressing the change in CSR scores of a firm on lagged changes in mutual
fund ownership. Column (1) and column (2) report the results for two subsamples: one where the firm’s
CSR score in below median and one where the firm’s CSR score is above median. Column (3) reports the
results for the whole sample. The dependent variable is the change in the CSR score of a firm from year t to
year t+1. All independent variables are changes from year t to year t-1 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2-6: Likelihood of Firms Offering CSR-Linked Compensation
Dependent Variable:

CSR Contract Dummyt+1
1
2
3
MF own
-2.052
(0.105)
CSR F-own
2.411
2.195
(0.217) (0.330)
CSR UF-own
-6.208* -9.683**
(0.066) (0.013)
CSR F-own X CSR Rating
0.100
(0.820)
CSR UF-own X CSR Rating
-2.052**
(0.020)
CSR Rating
0.034*** 0.029**
0.033
(0.009) (0.023) (0.112)
Firm Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo- R2
0.065
0.066
0.067
N
1,298
1,298
1,298
The table reports results from estimating different specifications of a logistic regression with CSR Contract
Dummyt+1 as the dependent variable. The logistic CSR Contract dummy takes a value of 1 if the firm offers
CSR contracts to its executives in a fiscal year, 0 otherwise. The firm control variables are the same as in
Table 2-4. The last column employs a conditional logistic regression model. All independent variables are
lagged by 1 year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2-7: CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses
Dependent Variable:
MF own
CSR F-own
CSR UF-own
ROA
Sales(Log)
Book Leverage
M/B Ratio
R&D
Advertising
Year Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2
N

CSR Strengtht+1
CSR Weaknesst+1
1
2
3
4
-2.621***
-0.590**
(0.000)
(0.013)
9.446***
-1.798*
(0.000)
(0.080)
-4.294***
-0.461
(0.000)
(0.135)
-0.070
-0.050
-0.502*** -0.513***
(0.601)
(0.702)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.131***
0.064
0.186*** 0.184***
(0.010)
(0.187)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.068
-0.027
-0.076
-0.077
(0.682)
(0.867)
(0.550)
(0.545)
0.000
-0.018
-0.007
-0.008
(0.997)
(0.376)
(0.642)
(0.600)
-0.974*
-0.801
0.178
0.187
(0.059)
(0.110)
(0.610)
(0.588)
-3.198*
-3.255*
-0.177
-0.211
(0.074)
(0.059)
(0.853)
(0.825)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.753
0.758
0.705
0.705
18,224
18,224
18,224
18,224

The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on lagged mutual fund ownership with
firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the CSR strengths of a firm in the first two columns and is the
CSR weakness of a firm in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm
fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1 st and 99th percentile.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 2-8: Alternative Explanations - Governance Variables
∆CSR Scoret+1
Governance Executive Compensation
1
2
∆CSR F-own
3.574***
3.405***
(0.004)
(0.004)
∆CSR UF-own
-0.959***
-0.962***
(0.000)
(0.000)
∆Board size
0.012
(0.462)
∆%independent directors 0.554***
(0.005)
∆CEO delta
0.001
(0.202)
∆CEO vega
0.070
(0.508)
Firm Controls
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.032
0.026
N
8,551
8,193
Dependent Variable:
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Appendix 2-1: Variable Descriptions for Chapter 2
Variable Name

Description

Dependent Variables
CSR Rating

CSR rating of the firm calculated from KLD data. It is
defined as the #number of strengths - #number of weaknesses
in the following categories: community, diversity, employee
relations, environment, human rights, and product. For a
more detailed description on how the strengths and
weaknesses are calculated, please read the manual from
Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD) database.

CSR Strengths

It is defined as the total number of strengths in the following
categories: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, human rights, and product.

CSR Weakness

It is defined as the total number of weaknesses in the
following categories: community, diversity, employee
relations, environment, human rights, and product.

Variables of Interest
Mutual Fund Ownership

Mutual fund ownership is the percentage of the firm’s
outstanding shares held by the mutual funds.

CSR F-Own

CSR F-Own is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares
held by the CSR-friendly mutual funds.

CSR UF-Own

CSR UF-Own is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding
shares held by the CSR-unfriendly mutual funds.

Control Variables
ROA

Net income before extraordinary items divided by total book
assets.
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Size

Log(sales).

Leverage

Book value of debt divided by market value of equity.

M/B

Market value of equity divided by book value of assets.

R&D

Research and Development spending divided by book value
of assets.

Advertising

Advertising expense divided by book value of assets.

Board Size

Number of members on the board of directors.

Board Independence

Percentage of independent members on the board of directors.

CEO delta

Sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes in stock price.

CEO vega

Sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes in stock return
volatility.
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Appendix 2-2: CSR Keywords
Keywords to Identify Executive Compensation as CSR-Linked.
Community
Compliance with ethical standards
Corporate social responsibility
Customer satisfaction
Diversity
Employee wellbeing
Energy efficiency
Environmental compliance
Environmental goals
Environmental performance
Environmental projects
Greenhouse gas emissions reductions
Health
Performance relative to a corporate social responsibility index
e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index
Product Safety
Reduced injury rates
Safety
Sustainability
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Appendix 2-3- Alternate measure of CSR F-own and CSR UF-own
Dependent Variable:
MF own

1
-2.321***
(0.000)

CSR F-own

Sales(Log)
Book Leverage
M/B Ratio
R&D
Advertising
Year Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2
N

4

3.129***
(0.000)

CSR UF-own
ROA

CSR Score t+1
2
3

0.081
(0.583)
-0.046
(0.507)
0.189
(0.363)
-0.046
(0.137)
-0.658
(0.318)
-3.397
(0.126)
Yes
Yes
0.630
19,162

2.737***
(0.000)
-5.120*** -4.977***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.068
0.110
0.120
(0.643)
(0.454)
(0.412)
-0.061
-0.039
-0.043
(0.377)
(0.581)
(0.537)
0.241
0.191
0.205
(0.244)
(0.359)
(0.323)
-0.066**
-0.047
-0.052*
(0.034)
(0.127)
(0.091)
-0.477
-0.643
-0.588
(0.463)
(0.326)
(0.364)
-3.267
-3.365
-3.313
(0.147)
(0.130)
(0.137)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.629
0.632
0.633
19,162
19,162
19,162

The table reports the results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on alternate measures of lagged
mutual fund ownership with firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-level data are obtained from
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI
ESG KLD stats database. The dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, human rights, and product. All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed
effects. All independent variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1 st and 99th percentile.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Chapter 3

3

Are Credit Markets Tone Deaf? Evidence from Credit
Default Swaps
3.1

Introduction

Accounting information plays a very important role in the pricing of financial
securities. In credit markets, researchers use a variety of accounting variables such as
financial ratios, earnings, management forecast news and analyst reports to price credit
securities such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS).11 However, most of these studies focus
either on the quantitative information in accounting disclosures or on the events
surrounding accounting disclosures. Surprisingly, little attention is given to the impact of
qualitative or “soft” information, such as linguistic tone, in these accounting disclosures
on CDS spreads. This is puzzling given that there is strong evidence to suggest that the
tone of accounting disclosure contains incremental, value-relevant information beyond
quantitative accounting measures; and internal and external stakeholders pay a lot of
attention to the tone of accounting disclosures.12
In this essay, we examine the role of linguistic tone of accounting disclosures in
the pricing of CDS contracts. Specifically, we investigate whether 10-Q/K filings with
higher proportions of uncertain words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible)

11

See e.g., Altman, (1968); Ohlson, (1980); Duffie and Lando, (2001); Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009);
Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, (2009); Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, (2011); Correia, Richardson,
and Tuna, (2012); Griffin, (2014); Tang, Tian, and Yan, (2015); Batta, Qiu, and Yu, (2016); Bhat, Callen,
and Segal, (2016), among others.
12

See e.g., Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal, (2010); Henry, (2008); Li, (2008); Loughran and
McDonald, (2011), and Jegadeesh and Wu, (2013), among others. Several studies show how disclosure
tone influences stakeholder behaviour. For example, equity investors react to disclosure tone (e.g., Demers
and Vega, 2011; Davis, Piger, and Sedor, 2012; Loughran and McDonald, 2013); shareholders react to
“overly optimistic” disclosure tone by suing firms/managers (Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman, 2011);
competitors change their real investment decisions based on the tone of the firms’ disclosure (Durnev and
Mangen, 2011); analysts respond to change in disclosure tone (e.g., Allee and Deangelis, 2014); and lastly,
managers who try to strategically “manage” the tone of their disclosure (e.g., Li, 2008; Huang, Teoh, and
Zhang, 2014).
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affect investors’ beliefs about the firm’s default risk as captured by CDS spreads. To
measure disclosure tone, we use the uncertain word list from the dictionaries developed
by Loughran and McDonald, (2011). We argue that the tone of 10-Q/K filings reflects the
management’s confidence in the firm’s business strategy, competitive position within the
industry, and future financial wellbeing. Any uncertainty expressed through the tone of
these disclosures should influence investors’ evaluations of the firm’s future value.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher the usage of uncertain words in these
disclosures, the greater the uncertainty in investors’ beliefs about the firm’s value and
thus, the higher the CDS spreads.
To test our hypothesis, we use daily CDS pricing data from WRDS-Markit over
the period of 2001 to 2016 for the U.S. firms. The CDS market provides an ideal
laboratory setting to test our hypothesis for the following reasons. First, CDS spreads
provide a direct measure of the market price of a firm’s default risk, which clearly
reflects what investors think about a firm’s likelihood of default. In comparison,
corporate bond spreads are sensitive to the choice of benchmark, risk-free rates, and may
capture other factors that are not related to default risk such as liquidity, taxes, and other
frictions.13 Second, CDS markets are informationally more efficient at capturing default
risk compared to bond markets. In fact, several studies show that CDS markets quickly
incorporate information related to a firm’s default risk and lead bond markets in creditrisk price discovery.14 Lastly, CDS contracts are standardized, highly liquid, and
available at a daily frequency. They reflect cross-sectional and time-series credit quality
information and allow academic researchers to perform clean and robust empirical tests.
We begin by examining the impact of uncertain tone on changes in CDS spreads.
Specifically, we focus on the changes in CDS spreads during the 11-day (-5, +5) event

13

For example, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann, (2001), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, (2005), and Chen,
Lesmond, and Wei, (2007) show that a large proportion of bonds spreads are determined by liquidity
factors, which do not necessarily reflect the default risk of the issuing firm.
14

See Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, (2014).
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window centered at the 10-Q/K filing date event.15 Changes in CDS spreads and the use
of event study analyses provide direct evidence on whether uncertain disclosure tone
contains relevant information about a firm’s future likelihood of default. We also
understand that disclosure tone cannot be the sole determinant of a firm’s default risk,
therefore, our analysis controls for several well-documented, firm-specific, as well as
market factors, explain changes in CDS spreads such as stock return, credit ratings, and
market volatility, among others.
We find a positive relation between uncertain disclosure tone and changes in CDS
spreads. Firms with greater uncertainty in the tone of 10-Q/K disclosure experience a
significant increase in their CDS spreads following the public disclosure. This effect is
economically and statistically significant. We find that one standard deviation increase in
uncertain tone increases the CDS spreads by 1.4 basis points (bps) relative to the mean
change across all firms of around 0.47 bps. Our finding is robust to controlling for equity
returns, market volatility, spot rate, aggregate default, and term premium.
We then investigate the impact of uncertain disclosure tone on the term structure
of CDS spreads across maturities. Duffie and Lando, (2001) predict that firms with
“noisy” accounting reports have significantly higher credit spreads at shorter maturities
compared to longer maturities. Therefore, the effect of disclosure uncertainty varies
across the term structure of credit spreads, with relatively higher impact for shorter
maturities. Consistent with this prediction, we find that CDS spreads with short-term
maturities have greater sensitivity to uncertain tone than long-term maturities. In fact,
uncertain tone sensitivities decline monotonically with maturity. This finding suggests
that disclosure tone contains useful default risk information for investors in valuation of
CDS contracts, particularly with short-term maturity.
We rule out several alternative explanations for our results. First, we consider
earnings surprise and firm-specific, “special” events including management guidance.

15

Following Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009), we focus on the exact filing date of the financial statements
to minimize the possibility that CDS spreads may incorporate other information.
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Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009) argue that earnings convey information about default
risk and show that changes in CDS spreads inversely relate to earnings surprises. As 10Q/K forms contain earnings information, it is plausible that the movement we observe in
CDS spreads might be due to “new” earnings information and not due to the tone of the
disclosure. To address this concern, we include earnings surprise in our baseline
specification and find that uncertain tone contains incremental information about default
risk that is not captured by earnings surprise. Besides earnings, public companies have to
report certain material corporate events such as bankruptcy, financial misstatements, or
other corporate major events in form 8-K. It is possible that such material events occur
during our event window and convey additional default information, which results in
changes in CDS spreads (e.g., Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011). To
alleviate this possibility, we rerun our baseline specification by excluding event windows
that coincide with special firm events reported in the form 8-K as well as management
guidance. We find that excluding such events has no impact on our conclusions. Second,
we consider readability of 10-Q/K filings. Li (2008), Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, (2011)
and Loughran and McDonald, (2014) show that firms with less readable and more
complex disclosures are associated with higher search costs and hence, greater riskiness.
One might argue that the observed increase in the default risk of firms in our study might
be due to the readability/complexity of such filings and not due to the tone of such
disclosures. To test this explanation, we control for readability measures in our baseline
regression and find that our results remain unchanged. Lastly, we consider alternative
word lists. Loughran and McDonald, (2013) argue that negative and weak modal word
lists might also capture the underlying ambiguity as the uncertain words. Similarly, the
difference between negative and positive tone in the 10-Q/K filings can proxy
uncertainty. To address these concerns, we re-estimate our baseline regression with these
alternative proxies of uncertainty and find that the effect of uncertain tone on CDS
spreads remains intact.
Our essay contributes to the literature in the following way. First, we highlight the
importance of linguistic tone in the pricing of CDS contracts in credit markets alongside
“quantitative” information from accounting disclosures. These findings add to the
existing accounting literature that has mainly focused on the quantitative aspects of
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accounting disclosures in the pricing of CDS contracts such as earnings, accrual, and cash
flow information (e.g., Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009; Batta, Qiu, and Yu, 2016);
management guidance (Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011); financial
statement comparability (Kim, Kraft, and Ryan, 2013); and financial asset reliability
(Arora, Richardson, and Tuna, 2014) among others.16 Second, our results add to the
growing literature in accounting and finance that examines the impact of textual analysis
on valuation of financial assets. Researchers have documented the usefulness of textual
analysis in generating value-relevant information to investors. For example, studies have
analyzed the tone, content, and sentiment in newspaper articles (e.g., Tetlock, 2007)
corporate disclosures (e.g., Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) press releases (e.g.,
Engelberg, 2008) as well as investor message boards (e.g., Antweiler, Werner, and Frank,
2004) and their impact on equity valuations. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
apply linguistic tone analysis to credit derivative pricing and show that disclosure tone of
the accounting reports provides valuable information to investors in credit markets.
The rest of the essay is as follows. The next section discusses related research and
outlines our main predictions. Section 3-3 describes the sample CDS and accounting tone
data and highlights our research design. Section 3-4 reports the main empirical tests
related to disclosure tone and CDS spreads. Section 3-5 considers several alternative
explanations for our results. Section 3-6 presents robustness checks. Section 3-7
concludes.

3.2

Prior Research and Hypotheses Development

Several prior studies highlight the importance of accounting information in
prediction of corporate defaults and valuation of credit market securities. For example,
Altman, (1968) and Ohlson, (1980) use accounting information such as financial ratios to
predict corporate bankruptcy. Duffie and Lando, (2001) show theoretically that noisy
accounting reports create uncertainty about a firm’s future value in the investors’ minds,
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See Griffin, (2014) and Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, (2014) for a comprehensive review
of accounting and finance research on CDS.
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which affects the term structure of credit spreads. Researchers also use hybrid models of
accounting- and market-based information in pricing financial distress through CDS
contracts (e.g., Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, 2009; Correia, Richardson, and Tuna, 2012).
Recent studies examine CDS spreads and their relationship with earning announcements
(Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009); cash flow news in management forecasts (Shivakumar,
Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011); the quality of internal control and cost of debt (Tang,
Tian, and Yan, 2015); the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (Bhat,
Callen, and Segal, 2016); risk factor disclosures in accounting reports (Chiu, Guan, and
Kim, 2017) among others.
However, most of these studies use quantitative information in the accounting
reports while giving little attention to the qualitative information in these reports. This is
surprising because qualitative information, such as linguistic tone and writing style (or
readability) of the accounting reports, conveys managers’ views about a firm’s future
performance over and above the numbers in the financial statements. It also gives insight
into the nature and magnitude of risks a firm faces in the future, which might have
significant implications on the future firm value. Several studies exploit the usefulness of
linguistic tone and/or readability of accounting disclosures in firm valuation.17 For
example, studies show that stock returns react strongly to change in tone of a firm’s 10Q/K filings (Feldman, Govindraj, Livnat, and Segal, 2010; Li, 2010; Loughran and
McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013) and readability of annual reports (Li, 2008).
Studies also show that the tone of 10-Q/K disclosures also affects return volatility and
analyst forecasts (Kothari, Li, and Short, 2009); future earnings (Davis and Tama-Sweet,
2012); and competitors’ behaviour (Li, Lundholm, and Minnis, 2013). In fact, linguistic
tone is so important to managers that they try to “strategically” manage the disclosure
tone to obfuscate unfavourable information and mislead investors (Huang, Toeh and
Zhang, 2014).
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Researchers also examine whether linguistic tone of press releases and conference calls affects a firm’s
expected future value (e.g., Henry, 2008; Doran, Peterson, and Price, 2010; Price, Doran, Peterson, and
Bliss, 2012; Huang, Teoh, and Zhang, 2014; Allee and Deangleis, 2015). For a comprehensive survey of
literature, please refer to Kearney and Liu, (2014) and Loughran and McDonald, (2016).
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Now, if linguistic tone is informative to equity investors in assessing firm risk,
then should it not be valuable to creditor market participants as well? The answer to this
question depends on whether linguistic tone conveys relevant information regarding a
firm’s future asset value. Traditional structural credit risk models, such as Merton,
(1974), argue that if investors can perfectly observe a firm’s asset value and if a firm’s
future asset value is stochastic, then accounting information (quantitative or qualitative)
has no role in pricing of credit risk. However, in practice, investors in credit markets do
not observe a firm’s assets perfectly. Because of this imperfect information environment,
as Duffie and Lando, (2001) argue, investors infer a firm’s true financial condition from
noisy accounting reports. Therefore, noisier accounting reports can lead to inaccurate
assessments of a firm’s default probabilities that, in turn, increase credit spreads.
In our setting, we measure the noise in accounting reports by the use of uncertain
words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible) in 10-Q/K filings that intuitively
capture the standard deviation of noise around the true firm value. Loughran and
McDonald, (2013) find that firms with a higher proportion of uncertain words in their
corporate disclosures face higher valuation uncertainty. We posit that firms that use a
high frequency of uncertain words in their quarterly 10-Q/K filings create valuation
uncertainty in investors’ minds, which results in higher credit spreads. Formally put, our
first hypothesis is the following:
H1: Firms with higher uncertain disclosure tone have higher changes in CDS
spreads around the disclosure event.
Furthermore, Duffie and Lando, (2001) also show that the shorter maturity credit
spreads are significantly more sensitive to uncertainty in accounting reports than longer
maturity credit spreads regardless of the riskiness of the firm. In other words, uncertainty
affects the term structure of credit spreads. This arises when investors are more
concerned about perceived default risk in the near future due to increased uncertainty
than the perceived risk in the distant future. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2: The impact of uncertain disclosure tone is larger for relatively shorter
maturity CDS contracts around the disclosure event, ceteris paribus.
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Lastly, Duffie and Lando, (2001) also suggest that the effect of uncertainty
regarding the firm’s true value on credit spreads is larger for firms with lower initial asset
value (i.e., firms with higher initial default probabilities). To proxy for a firm’s initial
probability of default, we use a firm’s credit ratings. We divide firms into two groups
based on credit ratings. Firms with a credit rating BBB and below are classified as
speculative grade, while firms with a credit rating higher than BBB are classified as
investment grade. We posit that the credit spreads of speculative grade firms (which are
more likely to default) should be more sensitive to uncertainty compared to investment
grade firms. Therefore, we expect the impact of uncertain disclosure tone to be larger for
firms with a relatively poor credit rating.
H3: The impact of uncertain disclosure tone is larger for firms with a relatively
poor credit rating around the disclosure event.

3.3

Data and Sample Selection

We test our hypotheses using the term structure of CDS spreads for U.S. firms.
We obtain CDS data from Markit Group on WRDS over the period of 2001–2016. Markit
is widely regarded as the leading provider of independent mark-to-market CDS data in
the industry. It comprises of composite, end-of-day CDS spreads for firms with highly
liquid contracts. We collect the daily data for all single name CDS contracts with one-,
three-, five-, seven-, and 10-year maturity. To maintain uniformity in contracts, we only
keep the CDS spreads for senior, unsecured debt with a modified restricting (MR) clause
and denominated in US dollars. We primarily focus on the spreads of five-year CDS
contracts, as they are the most liquid and have the best coverage in the database. We also
use one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year CDS contracts to test our prediction related to the
term structure of credit spreads.
The disclosure tone data are from the WRDS SEC analytics suite Readability and
Sentiment Analysis database. The database reports the lexical features of the language
used in accounting disclosures including financial report readability, linguistic
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complexity, and uncertainty/weak modal words for each firm. We focus on the
uncertainty word list (Fin-Unc) of Loughran and McDonald, (2011).18 This list includes
285 words, such as approximate, uncertain, depends, unpredictable, and indefinite, that
denote uncertainty through emphasis on imprecision rather than risk, particularly in
business/financial context. To measure uncertain tone, we count the number of words that
appear in the Loughran-McDonald Financial-Uncertainty words list and divide it by the
total number of words in each firm’s 10-Q/K disclosure every quarter. Other readability
measures such as Flesch-Kincaid index, Fog index, Coleman-Liau index, and Harvard
general inquirer negative index are also from the WRDS SEC analytics suite. We match
the daily CDS data with the disclosure tone data on the SEC filing date by linking
permco, gvkey, and cik unique identifiers. Our initial match contains 809 firms and
29,688 firm-quarter observations.
In addition to the CDS and tone data, we require the following firm-specific and
economy-wide data to create control variables: Firm-specific control variables such as
size, return of assets, and M/B ratio are from COMPUSTAT. We use gvkey to merge the
COMPUSTAT data to the CDS and tone data. To calculate the event period equity return
(EPER) and realized volatility (Rvol), we obtain data on equity prices, daily stock return,
and the number of shares outstanding for each firm from CRSP. The firm-level credit
rating data is the S&P long-term entity credit rating from COMPUSTAT. Economy-wide
control variables include the following: Risk-free rate (Rf) is the three-month treasurybill yield, Term Spread (TS) is the difference between the yields of a 10-year and oneyear government bond, and the Default Spread (DS) is the difference between the yield of
Moody’s Baa corporate bond and the yield of the 10-year constant maturity treasury
bond. Data for all these variables are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We also control for aggregate
investors’ risk appetites or market uncertainty by using a measure of implied volatility

18

The complete word list is available at http://www.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html.
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from S&P 500 index option prices with 30-day maturity, better known as VIX. The VIX
data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website.
Overall, after matching the control variables to the CDS data and disclosure tone
data using gvkey and cusip identifiers, our final sample has 27,655 firm-quarter
observations and 798 firms.

3.3.1

Research Design
We use the short-window event study design to examine the impact of disclosure

tone on the changes in CDS spreads. This design provides more direct evidence
concerning the economic impact of the event on the dependent variable as the firm is its
own control and mitigates heteroscedasticity concerns (Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009).
Our baseline regression specification is the following:
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑀/𝐵
+ 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽7 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 + 𝛽8 ∆𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽9 ∆𝑇𝑆
+ 𝛽10 ∆𝐷𝑆 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀

(3.1)

where the dependent variable, ΔCDS Spread, is the change in CDS spreads over an 11day window [-5, +5] centered on the 10-Q/K disclosure date in excess of the median
spread change for the CDS contracts with the same credit rating as the disclosing firm.
Focusing on the spread changes in excess of the credit rating helps us immune our
analysis to any systematic shocks within the credit rating category. The variable of
interest in the regression is UNCTONE, which is the uncertain tone of the 10-Q/K
disclosure. We measure UNCTONE by the percentage of uncertain words in each firm’s
10-Q/K disclosure every quarter (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
Following prior literature, we control for several firm-specific as well as
economy-wide variables that are associated with changes in CDS spreads. Firm-specific
controls include changes in firm size (ΔSize); return on assets (ΔROA); and market-tobook (ΔM/B). The changes in these firm-specific controls are relative to the value in the
previous quarter. We also control for cumulative daily equity returns (EPER) of the firm
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during the [-5, +5] period and the realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity return over
the event day [-252, -6] relative to the disclosure date. Using equity return and realized
volatility help sharpen our interpretation of UNCTONE by isolating the “pure” credit
risk-related information effect in the regression. We also include changes in market-wide
variables during the [-5, +5] period as controls: risk-free rate (ΔRf); Implied Volatility of
S&P 500 Index options (ΔVIX); Term Spread (ΔTS); and Default Spread (ΔDS). Our
regression model includes an interaction of time and industry fixed effects. We cluster the
standard errors at the firm level. The Appendix reports the definitions of all variables
used in the baseline regression.

3.3.2

Summary Statistics
Table 3-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The firms

covered in our sample are large firms with a mean (median) market value of $20.7 ($7.7)
billion. The firm size is highly skewed, with the average firm being three times as large
as the median firm. Given the skewness of the size distribution, we use the natural
logarithm of the firm size in all our empirical specifications and hence, log changes to
measure changes in the firm size.
The other firm-specific controls in our specifications include measure of
profitability captured using the return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (M/B),
event period equity return (EPER), and realized volatility (RVOL). The mean quarterly
ROA in our sample is 1.02%. There is a large variation in ROA of firms in our sample
with a 25th percentile value of 0.35% and a 75th percentile value of 1.95%. The mean
(median) M/B ratio is 0.93 (.781). EPER, defined as the cumulative daily returns of the
firm during the event period, has a mean (median) of 100.3 basis points (100.2). RVOL,
defined as the annualized realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity returns over the
past year has a mean (median) value of 0.345 (0.287).
The mean (median) CDS spread on the SEC filing day is 197 (87) basis points.
Our main dependent variable is the change in CDS spreads around the disclosure event.
The mean change in CDS spreads in our sample is around one basis point. Change in
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CDS spreads varies significantly in our sample with the 25th and 75th percentile values of
-3 and 3 basis points, respectively.
Our main independent variable of interest is disclosure uncertainty tone
(UNCTONE). The mean value of the disclosure uncertainty tone is 1.38%. The 25th and
75th percentile values for UNCTONE are 1.14% and 1.59%, respectively. The summary
statistics for our UNCTONE suggest that it is not highly skewed and does not suffer from
the presence of outliers.
The volatility index (VIX) of S&P 500 options has a mean (median) of 20.02
(17.58). The mean (median) three-month risk-free rate (Rf) is 1.42 (0.31) per cent. Term
spread (TS), defined as the 10-year U.S. treasury bond rate minus the risk-free rate, has a
mean (median) of 2.05 (2.23) per cent. Default spread (DS), defined as Moody’s Baa
Corporate bond rate relative to the 10-year treasury bond rate, has a mean (median) of
2.67 (2.66) per cent.

3.4
3.4.1

Empirical Results
Main Result

We begin our analysis by testing our first hypothesis. We examine the
relationship between the tone uncertainty and the change in five-year CDS spreads
around the disclosure event date. To do so, we estimate the panel regression in equation
(3.1). The dependent variable, ΔCDS Spread, is the change in CDS spreads over an 11day window [-5, +5] centered on the 10-Q/K disclosure date in excess of the median
spread change for the CDS contracts with the same credit rating as the disclosing firm.
We present the results of the panel regression in Table 3-2. The change in firmspecific variables are relative to the previous quarter. The market-level change variables
reflect the change in market condition around the disclosure event date. In all our
specifications, we include industry-quarter fixed effects and the clustered standard errors
at the firm level. The specification in column (A) presents the results for the univariate
regression. The coefficient on the measure of uncertain tone (UNCTONE) is positive and
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statistically significant, which indicates that the CDS spreads of firms with uncertain
disclosure tone increases around the disclosure event.
The specification in column (B) includes all firm level controls. The coefficient
on the uncertain tone measure is greater in magnitude compared to column (A) and
continues to be positive and significant. Examining the firm level controls, CDS spreads
increase around the disclosure event date for firms that have recently experienced a
decline in firm size. We also find that the CDS spreads increase for firms that have
experienced an increase in market-to-book ratio. The coefficient on the event period
cumulative return (EPER) indicates that firms with lower cumulative daily returns have a
larger change in CDS spreads. These results are consistent with the intuition that lower
equity returns, drop in firm equity, and market-to-book ratio increase default risk as
reflected by an increase in CDS spreads.
The specification in column (C) includes all market level controls along with
firm-specific controls. The market level controls do not affect the magnitude or
significance of the uncertain tone measure but result in some improvement in the R2. The
uncertain tone measure continues to be positive and statistically significant. The
magnitude and significance of the firm controls also continue to be similar to the
specification in column (B). Interestingly, we fail to detect any relationship between the
change in VIX and the change in CDS spreads. However, the coefficient on the change in
default spread is positive and significant, suggesting that firm CDS spreads increase with
the increase in aggregate default risk.
Overall, the results in columns (A) to (C) confirm our first hypothesis that firms
with relatively higher uncertain disclosure tone have a higher change in five-year CDS
spreads. This result is also economically significant: the coefficient in column (2)
indicates that an increase in uncertain disclosure tone from the 25th to 75th percentile (an
increase of 0.45%) is associated with a 1.84 basis points higher change in CDS spreads
around the event window.
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3.4.2

Term Structure of CDS Spreads
Consistent with Duffie and Lando, (2001), our second hypothesis argues that the

uncertainty in accounting reports about a firm’s assets affects the credit spreads of shortterm maturity contracts more than long-term maturity contracts. We examine this
hypothesis using information from the term structure of CDS spreads. We use changes in
one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year CDS spreads to estimate equation 3.1. We include both
firm-specific and market controls for all maturities. The results of our analysis are in
Table 3-3. Columns (2) to (5) present the regressions results for one-, three-, seven-, and
10-year maturity contracts, respectively. The positive and significant coefficient on
uncertain disclosure tone (UNCTONE) indicates that firms with higher uncertain tone
have relatively higher change in spreads across all of these maturity contracts. More
importantly, the coefficient on uncertain disclosure tone increases monotonically as the
maturity decreases. The statistical significance of these coefficients is also higher at the
short end of the term structure. Economically, as the uncertain tone measure moves from
the 25th to 75th percentile, the change in spread for a one-year maturity contract is 3.2
basis points versus 1.5 basis points for a 10-year maturity contract. This dramatic
difference in the impact of the uncertain tone measure on the term structure of CDS
spreads is consistent with the theoretical result in Duffie and Lando, (2001).
In the last column, we explicitly examine the statistical significance of the impact
of tone uncertainty on the slope of the term structure of credit spreads. We estimate the
relationship between tone uncertainty and the change in the slope of the term structure
measured using the difference between 10-year and one-year credit spreads. The slope
change is also measured in excess of the median slope change for the CDS contracts with
the same credit rating as the disclosing firm. Consistent with the monotonic decline in the
uncertainty coefficient with maturity, we find that the change in the slope negatively
relates to the uncertainty tone.

3.4.3

Effect of Issuer Ratings
Duffie and Lando, (2001) also show that the accounting precision of the firm’s

assets affects the short-term credit spreads of riskier firms (firms with low asset value)
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more than safer firms (firms with higher asset value). This implies that the impact of the
uncertain disclosure tone on CDS spread changes should be larger for firms with a
relatively worse initial credit rating. We test this hypothesis by splitting the sample
between investment grade and speculative grade rating categories.
Table 3-4 examines the relationship between uncertain disclosure tone and CDS
spreads across firms with investment grade and speculative grade credit rating separately.
We identify investment grade firms as those that have a Standard & Poor (S&P) longterm credit rating BBB- or better. Speculative grade firms are those that have an S&P
long-term credit worse than BBB-. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3-4 present the results
of the regression in equation 3.1 for investment grade firms. Columns (4) and (5) present
the results for speculative grade firms. The coefficient on the uncertain disclosure tone is
positive and significant for both investment grade and speculative grade firms. However,
as expected by hypothesis 3, the positive coefficient is significantly larger in magnitude
for speculative grade firms compared to investment grade firms. For speculative grade
firms, an increase in the uncertain disclosure tone from the 25th to 75th percentile is
associated with almost five times (4.98 bps) greater change in CDS spreads than for
investment grade firms (1.18 bps).

3.5

Alternative Explanations

We examine whether our findings are robust to other potential explanations
around the disclosure event date. Specifically, we focus on the role of earnings surprise,
management guidance, and other corporate events in the form of 8-K statements. Finally,
we also examine the role of readability of financial statements in explaining our findings.

3.5.1

Earnings Surprise, Management Guidance, and Other
Special Firm-Specific Events
Firms with negative earnings surprise around the disclosure date are likely to have

an increase in credit spreads due to perceived increase in default probabilities. In our
regression analysis, we explicitly control for several determinants of the changes in
default probabilities. The variables such as change in firm size, cumulative returns,
change in market-to-book ratio, and realized volatility are likely to capture the effect of
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earnings surprise and therefore, the associated changes in default probabilities.
Nevertheless, we explicitly account for the effect of earnings surprise in our regression
analysis.
We define earnings surprise as the difference between the actual earnings per
share and the median analyst estimate standardized by the price of the stock. In column
(1) of Table 3-5, we repeat our regression analysis with earnings surprise as an additional
control along with all firm and market controls. The positive coefficient on uncertain
disclosure continues to be statistically significant and similar in magnitude even after
controlling for earnings surprise. The coefficient and significance of other firm and
market controls are also largely unaffected. The earnings surprise coefficient is negative,
suggesting that firms with a positive surprise have a decline in CDS spreads. However,
the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Besides earnings, public companies must report certain material corporate events
such as bankruptcy, financial misstatements, or other corporate major events in the 8-K
statement. It is possible that such material events occur during our event window and
convey additional default information, which results in changes in CDS spreads (e.g.,
Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011) To alleviate this possibility, we rerun our
baseline specification by excluding event windows that coincide with special firmspecific events reported in the 8-K as well as management guidance.
Column (2) of Table 3-5 reports the results of regression analysis by excluding
firms that release 8-K statements around the event dates. The specification includes all
firm and market controls. The positive coefficient on the uncertain disclosure tone is
largely similar in magnitude and continues to be statistically significant. In column (3),
we drop the firms that have management guidance around the event date. Once again, we
obtain a positive coefficient on uncertain disclosure tone and the statistical significance is
even higher in this case. In column (4), we drop both the firms with 8-K statements and
management guidance around the event date. The results are robust to dropping these
firms.
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In summary, our results immune to earnings surprise, firms issuing 8-K
statements, or management guidance around the event dates. The positive effect of
uncertain disclosure tone on CDS spreads changes continues to be statistically significant
even after controlling for and dropping such events.

3.5.2

Disclosure Readability and Complexity
In this section, we examine the implications of 10-Q/K filing readability for the

uncertain tone and CDS spread relation. Several studies show that firms with less
readable and more complex disclosures are associated with higher search costs and
hence, greater riskiness (Li, 2008; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, 2011). One might argue that
the observed increase in the riskiness of firms in our study might be due to the
readability/complexity of such filings and not due to the tone of such disclosures. To test
the explanation that our measure of uncertain tone may be capturing the complexity of
filings, we include various measures of readability/complexity as additional controls in
our base regression.
Following Li, (2008) and Loughran and McDonald, (2014), we consider four
measures of readability/complexity, which include the log of file size, Kincaid index, Fog
index, and Coleman-Liau index. We refer the reader to Li, (2008) for additional details
about these readability/complexity indices. We include each of these indices separately as
an additional control together with all firm and market controls. Table 3-6 presents our
results of our regression analysis including these additional controls. The main
conclusion from Table 3-6 is that our results are unaffected by including these readability
indices. The magnitude of the coefficient on uncertain tone measure is unchanged and it
continues to be positive and significant. Moreover, none of the readability indices has a
significant impact on the changes in CDS spreads around the disclosure event date.

57

3.5.3

Other Word Lists
We now turn to other linguistic tones expressed in the 10-Q/K filings. Loughran

and McDonald, (2013) argue that negative and weak modal words might also capture the
underlying ambiguity as the uncertain words. Similarly, another proxy of uncertainty can
be the net negative tone, that is, the difference between negative and positive tone in the
10-Q/K filings. Net negative tone captures managers’ net aggregate sentiments about the
future value of the firm. If the net negative tone is positive, then it reflects managers’
pessimism about the future, which can lead to uncertainty around the true value of the
firm and convey value-relevant information to credit markets. However, if both the
alternate word lists and net negative tone capture the same source of ambiguity, then
controlling for these variables in our baseline regression should make the coefficient of
uncertain tone economically and statistically insignificant.
We test whether these alternative measures have incremental information beyond
the uncertain tone in Table 3-7. We include alternative word lists such as negative, weak
modal, and net negative tone (negative – positive) as control variables in our baseline
regression. We find that negative tone is positively associated with changes in CDS
spreads by itself; however, when we include the uncertain tone, the impact of negative
tone weakens significantly. The economic magnitude drops by more than a quarter and
statistical significance drops from five to 10 per cent. In addition, we do not see any
significant association between a weak modal word list and net negative tone and
changes in CDS spreads. Overall, the results in Table 3-7 suggest that uncertain tone
captures distinct default risk information that other measures fail to capture.

3.6

Robustness Checks

We conduct the following additional tests to check the robustness of our results.
First, we test the sensitivity of the results in Table 3-2 to alternative event window
specifications. We replicate our baseline regression with varying lengths of event window
centered around the 10-Q/K disclosure filing date such as (i) three-day window ([-1, +1]);
(ii) seven-day window ([-3, +3]); (iii) 21-day window ([-10, +10]); and (iv) six-day
window ([0, +5]). Our conclusions remain unchanged after these modifications. Second,
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we examine whether the inclusion of financial firms affects our results. Financial firms
are very different from nonfinancial firms because financial firms are highly regulated
and often act as the dealers and counterparties in CDS contracts. Therefore, we exclude
financial firms from our analysis. Column (5) of Table 3-8 reports these results. We find
that excluding financial firms from our sample has little impact on our inferences. Lastly,
we test whether the inclusion of the financial crisis period of 2007–2009 alters our
conclusions. Lok and Richardson, (2011) argue that credit markets reacted differently
during the financial crisis when all firms moved closer to their default points. They state,
“researchers need to be careful when using spread data from the financial crisis period,
especially the latter part of 2008 and early 2009.” To make sure that our results are robust
to financial crisis, we remove the crisis period from December 2007 to June 2009 from
our sample data. Column (6) of Table 3-8 reports the results when we exclude the
financial crisis period. The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant,
which is very similar to column (3) of Table 3-2.

3.7

Conclusions

Accounting disclosures are an important source of information for investors.
Beyond disclosing the quantitative information, these disclosures also contain qualitative
information that helps investors assess the value of the firm. An important piece of
qualitative information is the linguistic tone of the disclosure. The tone of the accounting
disclosure is important because it contains value-relevant information beyond the current
quantitative measures.
In this essay, we examine whether credit markets react to the linguistic tone of
accounting disclosures. In particular, we focus on the uncertain tone of 10-Q/K filings of
firms. We find that credit markets react, measured by changes in CDS spreads, negatively
to the uncertain tone expressed in the firms’ accounting disclosures. Consistent with the
Duffie and Lando, (2001) model, we find that uncertainty expressed in the accounting
disclosures affects the term structure of credit spreads. We find that CDS spreads with
short-term maturities are more sensitive to the uncertain tone than long-term maturities.
Taken together, these results underscore the importance of the linguistic tone of
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accounting disclosures, which influences investors’ assessments about the firms’ future
credit risks.
Our results have implications for managers as well as regulators. Because
investors pay close attention to not only the quantitative information but also to how
managers express their views in the disclosures, managers should be extremely careful in
articulating firm-related information. The managers can significantly reduce valuation
risks by simply choosing the right words. From a regulatory perspective, our results show
the incremental valuation relevance of required qualitative information. Regulators can
encourage firms to disclose more nonfinancial information that can improve the price
discovery mechanism in the market.

60

References for Chapter 3
Allee, K. and DeAngelis, M. (2015). The structure of voluntary disclosure narratives:
Evidence from tone dispersion. Journal of Accounting Research, 53, 241–274.
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23, 589–609.
Antweiler, W. and Frank, M. Z. (2004). Is all that talk just noise? The information
content of internet stock message boards. Journal of Finance, 59, 1259–1294.
Arora, N., Richardson, S., and Tuna, I. (2014). Asset reliability and security prices:
Evidence from credit markets. Review of Accounting Studies, 19, 363–395.
Augustin, P., Subrahmanyam, M., Tang, D., and Wang, S. (2014). Credit default swaps:
A survey. Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 9, 1–196.
Augustin, P., Subrahmanyam, M., Tang, D., and Wang, S. (2016). Credit default swaps:
Past, present, and future. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 8, 175–196.
Batta, G. (2011). The direct relevance of accounting information for credit default swap
pricing. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38, 1096–1122.
Batta, G., Qiu, J., and Yu, F. (2016). Credit derivatives and analyst behavior. The
Accounting Review, 91, 1315–1343.
Bhat, G., Callen, J. L., and Segal, D. (2014). Credit risk and IFRS: The case of credit
default swaps. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 29, 129–162.
Callen, J. L., Livnat, J., and Segal, D. (2009). The impact of earnings on the pricing of
credit default swaps. The Accounting Review, 84, 1363–1394.
Collin-Dufresne, P. and Goldstein, B. (2001). Do credit spreads reﬂect stationary
leverage ratios? The Journal of Finance, 56, 1929–1957.

61

Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., and Martin, J. (2001). The determinants of credit
spread changes. The Journal of Finance, 56, 2177–2207.
Correia, M., Richardson, S., and Tuna, I. (2012). Value investing in credit markets.
Review of Accounting Studies, 17, 572–609.
Das, S. R., Hanouna, P., and Sarin, A. (2009). Accounting-based versus market-based
cross-sectional models of CDS spreads. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 719–730.
Davis, A., Piger, J., and Sedor, L. (2012). Beyond the numbers: Measuring the
information content of earnings press release language. Contemporary Accounting
Research, 29, 845–868.
Davis, A. and Tama-Sweet, I. (2012). Managers’ use of language across alternative
disclosure outlets: earnings press release language versus MD&A. Contemporary
Accounting Research, 29, 804–837.
Doran, J., Peterson, D., and Price, S. (2012). Earnings conference call content and stock
price: The case of REITs. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45, 402–
434.
Demers, E. and Vega, C. (2011). Linguistic Tone in Earnings Announcements: News Or
Noise? Working Paper, INSEAD.
Duﬀee, G. (1999). Estimating the price of default risk. Review of Financial Studies, 12,
197–226.
Duffie, D. and Lando, D. (2001). Term structures of credit spreads with incomplete
accounting information. Econometrica, 69, 633–664.
Durnev, A. and Mangen, C. (2011). The Real Effects of Disclosure Tone: Evidence from
Restatements. Working Paper.
Elkamhi, R., Jacobs, K., Langlois, H., and Ornthanalai, C. (2012). Accounting
information releases and CDS spreads. Working Paper, University of Toronto.

62

Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Agrawal, D., and Mann, C. (2001). Explaining the Rate
Spread on Corporate Bonds. The Journal of Finance, 56, 247–277.
Engelberg, J. Costly Information Processing: Evidence from Earnings Announcements
(January 18, 2008). AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1107998.
Ericsson, J., Jacobs, K., and Oviedo, R. (2009). The determinants of credit default swap
premia. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44, 109–132.
Feldman, R., Govindaraj, S., Livnat, J., and Segal, B. (2010). Management’s tone change,
post earnings announcement drift and accruals. Review of Accounting Studies, 15, 915–
953.
Griffin, P. A. (2014). The market for credit default swaps: new insights into investors’
use of accounting information? Accounting & Finance, 54, 847–883.
Griffin, P. A., Hong, H. A., and Kim, J. B. (2016). Price discovery in the CDS market:
the informational role of equity short interest. Review of Accounting Studies, 21, 1116–
1148.
Guay, W., Samuels, D., and Taylor, D. (2016). Guiding through the Fog: Financial
statement complexity and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
62, 234–269.
Hanley, K. W. and Hoberg, G. (2012). Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the
underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 103, 235–254.
Henry, E. (2008). Are investors influenced by how earnings press releases are written?
Journal of Business Communication, 45, 363–407.
Henry, E. and Leone, A. (2015). Measuring qualitative information in capital markets
research: comparison of alternative methodologies to measure disclosure tone. The
Accounting Review, 91, 153–178.

63

Huang, X., Teoh, S., and Zhang, Y. (2014). Tone management. The Accounting Review,
89, 1083–1113.
Kearney, C. and Liu, S. (2014). Textual sentiment in finance: A survey of methods and
models. International Review of Financial Analysis, 33, 171–185.
Kim, S., Kraft, P., and Ryan, S. (2013). Financial statements comparability and credit
risk. Review of Accounting Studies, 18, 783–823.
Kothari, S., Li, X., and Short, J. (2009). The effect of disclosures by management,
analysts, and business press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: A
study of using content analysis. The Accounting Review, 84, 1639–1670.
Lehavy, R., Li, F., and Merkley, K. (2011). The effect of annual report readability on
analyst following and the properties of their earnings forecasts. Accounting Review, 86,
1087–1115.
Li, F. (2008). Annual Report Readability, Current Earnings, and Earnings Persistence.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45, 221–47.
Li, F., (2010). The information content of forward looking statements in corporate
filings—A naïve Bayesian machine learning approach. Journal of Accounting Research,
48, 1049–1102.
Li, F., Lundholm, R., and Minnis, M. (2013). A Measure of Competition Based on 10‐K
Filings. Journal of Accounting Research, 51, 399–436.
Li, J. Y. and Tang, D. (2016). The leverage externalities of credit default swaps. Journal
of Financial Economics, 120, 491–513.
Lok, S. and Richardson, S. (2011). Credit markets and ﬁnancial information. Review of
Accounting Studies, 16, 487–500.

64

Longstaff, F. A., Mithal, S., and Neis, E. (2005). Corporate yield spreads: Default risk or
liquidity? New evidence from the credit default swap market. Journal of Finance, 60,
2213–2253.
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2011). When is a liability not a liability? Textual
analysis, dictionaries, and 10‐Ks. Journal of Finance, 66, 35–65.
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2013). IPO first-day returns, offer price revisions,
volatility, and form S-1 language. Journal of Financial Economics, 109, 307–326.
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2014). Measuring readability in financial disclosures.
Journal of Finance, 69, 1643–1671.
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2016). Textual analysis in accounting and finance: A
survey. Journal of Accounting Research, 54, 1187–1230.
Mayew, W. J., Sethuraman, M., and Venkatachalam, M. (2014). MD&A Disclosure and
the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern. The Accounting Review, 90, 1621–
1651.
Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates.
The Journal of Finance, 29, 449–470.
Oehmke, M. and Zawadowski, A. (2017). The anatomy of the CDS market. Review of
Financial Studies, 30, 80–119.
Ohlson, J. A. (1980). Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy.
Journal of Accounting Research, 18, 109–131.
Price, S., Doran, J., Peterson, D., and Bliss, B. (2012). Earnings conference calls and
stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 36, 992–1011.
Rogers, J. L., Van Buskirk, A., and Zechman, S. (2011). Disclosure tone and shareholder
litigation. The Accounting Review, 86, 2155–2183.

65

Shivakumar, L., Urcan, O., Vasvari, F. P., and Zhang, L. (2011). The debt market
relevance of management earnings forecasts: Evidence from before and during the credit
crisis. Review of Accounting Studies, 16, 464.
Tan, H. T., Ying Wang, E., and Zhou, B. (2014). When the use of positive language
backfires: The joint effect of tone, readability, and investor sophistication on earnings
judgments. Journal of Accounting Research, 52, 273–302.
Tang, D. Y., Tian, F., and Yan, H. (2015). Internal Control Quality and Credit Default
Swap Spreads. Accounting Horizons, 29 (3): 603–629.
Tang, D. Y. and Yan, H. (2010). Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 743–753.
Tetlock, P. C. (2007). Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the
stock market. Journal of Finance, 62, 1139–1168.
Yu, F. (2005). Accounting transparency and the term structure of credit spreads. Journal
of Financial Economics, 75, 53–84.
Zhang, B. Y., Zhou, H., and Zhu, H. (2009). Explaining credit default swap spreads with
the equity volatility and jump risks of individual firms. Review of Financial Studies, 22,
5099–5131.
Zhang, G. and Zhang, Z. (2013). Information efficiency of the U.S. credit default swap
market: Evidence from earnings surprises. Journal of Financial Stability, 9, 720–730.

66

Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Distribution of Variables (Levels)
Variable Name
Mean
STD
P25
Median
196.825 495.871 44.995 87.376
CDS Spread (bps)
1.378
0.349
1.139
1.358
UNCTONE (%)
8.973
1.412
8.042
8.959
Size
0.010
0.039
0.004
0.011
ROA
0.930
0.781
0.416
0.728
M/B
100.314 12.573 97.132 100.169
EPER (bps)
0.345
0.221
0.209
0.287
Rvol
20.021
9.368
13.690 17.580
VIX
31.000
Risk-free Rate (Rf) (bps) 142.338 171.769 9.000
205.501 111.692 149.000 223.000
Term Spread (TS) (bps)
Default Spread (DS) (bps) 267.464 85.154 205.000 266.000

P75
192.615
1.587
9.863
0.0195
1.199
103.162
0.403
22.810
247.000
283.000
306.000

N
26,003
26,002
25,377
26,003
25,377
24,978
24,984
25,935
26,001
26,001
26,001

Panel B: Distribution of Variables (Changes)
Variable Name
Mean
STD
0.466
109.866
∆CDS Spread (bps)
0.010
0.292
∆Size
0.000
0.048
∆ROA
0.000
0.187
∆M/B
0.240
4.184
∆VIX
-2.023 16.288
∆Rf (bps)
-0.756 21.445
∆TS (bps)
1.357
12.933
∆DS (bps)

P75
3.236
0.113
0.005
0.070
1.920
3.000
11.000
8.000

N
25,742
24,632
25,297
24,632
25,935
25,935
25,935
25,935

P25
-3.229
-0.070
-0.005
-0.056
-1.870
-3.000
-13.000
-5.000

Median
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.006
-0.080
16.288
-2.000
2.000

This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the important variables used in regressions. CDS Spread is
the five-year CDS spread on the event day. Uncertainty is the proportion of uncertainty words to the total
number of words in the document as measured by Loughran and McDonald (2011). Size is the logarithm of
the market capitalization of the firm. ROA is the return on assets. M/B is the market value of equity divided
by the book value of the total assets of the firm. Event-period equity return is the cumulative daily equity
returns calculated over the event period. Rvol is the realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity returns
over the past year. CR is the Standard & Poor credit rating of the firm. Risk-free Rate is the three-month
U.S. Treasury bill rate. Term Spread is the difference between 10-year U.S. Treasury bond rate and the
three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Default Spread is the Moody’s corporate bond yield relative to the
yield on 10-year Treasury bond rate. All the firm-specific change variables represent the change in value
from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the
event period. ∆CDS Spread is the change in five-year maturity CDS spreads over the event period relative
to the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same period.
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Table 3-2: The Effect of Uncertain Tone on the Change in CDS Spreads
DV:
UNCTONEi,t
∆Sizei,t
∆M/Bi,t
∆ROAi,t
EPERi,t
Rvoli,t
∆VIX[-5,+5]
∆Rf[-5,+5]
∆TS[-5,+5]
∆DS[-5,+5]
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
A
B
C
3.336**
3.864***
3.890***
(0.015)
(0.009)
(0.008)
-46.232**
-46.500**
(0.016)
(0.015)
32.690***
33.117***
(0.003)
(0.002)
4.289
4.266
(0.868)
(0.869)
-2.402***
-2.399***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.861
-2.136
(0.966)
(0.915)
-0.187
(0.597)
0.125
(0.162)
0.076
(0.369)
0.514***
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.009
0.077
0.081
24,754
24,009
24,009

This table reports the effect of uncertain tone in 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads around
the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The
independent variable of interest is the uncertainty word proportion as defined in the Appendix. The other
independent variables consist of firm controls: change in size; change in return on assets (ROA); change in
market-to-book ratio (M/B); event period return; and realized volatility (Rvol), and market controls: change
in VIX; change in risk-free rate (Rf); change in term spread; change in default spread. All the firm-specific
change variables represent the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS,
and ∆DS represent the change in value over the event period. The standard errors are clustered at firm level
and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016.
Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3-3: Term Structure of CDS Spreads: Uncertain Tone and the Change in CDS
Spreads
DV:
UNCTONEi,t
∆Sizei,t
∆M/Bi,t
∆ROAi,t
EPERi,t
Rvoli,t
∆VIX[-5,+5]
∆Rf[-5,+5]
∆TS[-5,+5]
∆DS[-5,+5]
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

1 Yr
6.614***
(0.007)
-61.711**
(0.013)
52.868***
(0.000)
-24.449
(0.555)
-3.709***
(0.000)
-14.816
(0.688)
-0.736
(0.199)
0.149
(0.318)
0.161
(0.259)
0.458*
(0.071)
Yes
0.068
21,902

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
3 Yr
7 Yr
10 Yr
5.196***
3.546**
3.230**
(0.002)
(0.016)
(0.027)
-52.020***
-39.400**
-38.232**
(0.007)
(0.017)
(0.022)
36.981***
29.319***
28.024***
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.003)
-14.257
-5.715
-11.507
(0.617)
(0.802)
(0.591)
-2.429***
-2.428***
-2.270***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-12.032
2.294
8.969
(0.616)
(0.904)
(0.614)
-0.056
-0.073
-0.005
(0.881)
(0.832)
(0.991)
0.143
0.178*
0.125
(0.168)
(0.050)
(0.174)
0.098
0.105
0.067
(0.333)
(0.222)
(0.435)
0.448***
0.530***
0.520***
(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.071
0.086
0.085
23,019
22,889
22,558

10 Yr–1 Yr
-3.281*
(0.091)
24.770**
(0.025)
-25.946***
(0.000)
12.651
(0.638)
1.373***
(0.000)
23.099
(0.385)
0.781**
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.978)
-0.082
(0.258)
0.066
(0.696)
Yes
0.022
21,292

This table reports the effect of uncertainty tone in 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in CDS
spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to the median
change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The other independent
variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent the change in value
from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the
event period. All columns have firm and market controls. We present the results for various maturity
contracts (one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year). 10 Yr–1 Yr represents the change in 10-year CDS spreads
minus the change in one-year CDS spreads in excess of the median change in the same rating group. The
standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The
sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by
***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3-4: Investment Grade and Speculative Grade Firms
DV:
UNCTONEi,t
∆Sizei,t
∆M/Bi,t
∆ROAi,t
EPERi,t
Rvoli,t
∆VIX[-5,+5]
∆Rf[-5,+5]
∆TS[-5,+5]
∆DS[-5,+5]
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
Investment Grade
Speculative Grade
2.601**
2.629**
11.103*
11.076*
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.085)
(0.084)
-33.281***
-33.391***
-57.399*
-58.523*
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.075)
(0.070)
16.244**
16.347**
62.773**
63.700**
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.029)
(0.027)
2.631
2.932
-9.918
-11.921
(0.735)
(0.707)
(0.790)
(0.750)
-1.236***
-1.216***
-2.978***
-2.953***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-25.080
-25.515
18.053
14.472
(0.168)
(0.162)
(0.693)
(0.749)
-0.023
0.243
(0.884)
(0.827)
0.021
0.267
(0.631)
(0.448)
0.015
0.183
(0.669)
(0.590)
0.177***
1.554***
(0.003)
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.081
0.082
0.086
0.091
18,359
18,359
5,650
5,650

This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q and 10-K statements on the changes in CDS spreads
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The
independent variable of interest is the uncertainty word proportion as defined in the Appendix. The other
independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent the
change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change
in value over the event period. We present the results for sub-samples based on credit ratings. The standard
errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample
period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
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Table 3-5: Earnings Surprise and Special Firm-Specific Events
DV:
Earnings
Surprise
UNCTONEi,t
SUEi,t
All Controls
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

3.320**
(0.011)
-17.083
(0.565)
Yes
Yes
0.093
22,896

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
Excluding
Excluding
8-K
Management
Statements
Guidance (MG)
2.933**
4.449***
(0.031)
(0.005)

Yes
Yes
0.075
15,380

Yes
Yes
0.080
21,011

Excluding
8-K and
MG
3.312**
(0.029)

Yes
Yes
0.086
13,252

This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads around
the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The
independent variable of interest is the uncertain tone as defined in the Appendix. Earnings Surprise is
defined as the actual earnings minus the median analyst estimate standardized by price of the stock. The
other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent
the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the
change in value over the event period. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are
reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3-6: Report Readability, Uncertain Tone, and CDS Spreads
DV:
UNCTONEi,t
Readabilityi,t
All Controls
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
Ln (File Size)
3.895***
(0.008)
-0.072
(0.903)
Yes
Yes
0.078
24,009

Fog Index
3.929***
(0.008)
0.225
(0.606)
Yes
Yes
0.079
24,009

Flesch-Kincaid
3.935***
(0.008)
0.314
(0.495)
Yes
Yes
0.079
24,009

Coleman-Liau
3.837***
(0.008)
0.207
(0.733)
Yes
Yes
0.079
24,009

This table reports the effect of uncertainty tone on 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The
independent variable of interest is uncertain tone defined in the Appendix. Readability measures include:
log of 10-Q/K filings size (in megabytes), as defined by Loughran and McDonald (2014); Fog Index is 0.4*
(average number of words per sentence + per cent of complex words); Flesch-Kincaid Index is
0.39*(number of words/number of sentences) + 11.8*(number of syllables/number of words) – 15.59;
Coleman- Liau Index is 0.0588*(average number of letters per 100 words) – 0.296*(average number of
sentences per 100 words) – 15.8. The other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the
firm-specific change variables represent the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread,
∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the event period. The standard errors are
clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. Industry X quarter
fixed effects and credit rating fixed effects are included in all regressions. The sample period is from 2001
to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3-7: Other Word Lists and CDS Spreads
DV:
A

B

UNCTONEi,t
NEGTONE

1.879**
(0.039)

WEAK MODAL

3.804
(0.244)

Net (NEG – POS)

Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5]
C
D
E
F
3.413** 4.159** 3.504**
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.012)
1.489*
(0.085)
-0.661
(0.869)
1.690*
1.331
(0.053)
(0.110)

Harvard IV NEG
All Controls
Ind X Qtr FE
Adj. R2
N

Yes
Yes
0.081
24,009

Yes
Yes
0.078
23,995

Yes
Yes
0.081
24,009

Yes
Yes
0.081
24,009

Yes
Yes
0.078
23,995

Yes
Yes
0.078
23,995

G
3.533**
(0.016)

62.867
(0.332)
Yes
Yes
0.079
23,995

This table reports the effect of other word lists on the uncertain tone and changes in CDS spreads around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The
dependent variable is the change in five-year maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to the
median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The independent variable of interest is uncertain tone defined in the
Appendix. Other word lists are from Loughran and McDonald (2011) and include: NEGTONE, defined as percentage of negative words in 10-Q/K filings;
WEAK MODAL, defined as percentage of weak modal words in 10-Q/K filings. Net (NEG – POS) is the difference in percentage of negative and positive words
in 10-Q/K filings. Harvard IV NEG is the list of negative words classified by Harvard Inquirer Dictionary. The other independent variables are the same as in
Table 3-2. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016.
Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3-8: Robustness Checks: Alternate Event Window and Other Specifications
DV:

Changes in CDS Spreads
Alternate Window Specification

UNCTONEi,t
All Controls
Ind x Qtr FE
Adj R2
N

[-1, +1]

[-3, +3]

[-10, +10]

[0, +5]

A
1.559*
(0.082)
Yes
Yes
0.020
24,110

B
3.711**
(0.013)
Yes
Yes
0.070
24,027

C
4.860***
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
0.098
23,900

D
3.371***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
0.090
24,061

Non-Financial

Non-Crisis

E
3.011**
(0.029)
Yes
Yes
0.077
19,907

F
2.950**
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
0.038
21,071

This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q/K on the changes in CDS spreads around the event window. The dependent variable is change in five-year
maturity CDS spreads during the event window relative to the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The
independent variable of interest is UNCTONEi,t defined in the Appendix. The other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. The standard errors are
clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of
1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Appendix 3-1: Variable Descriptions for Chapter 3
Variable Name
CDS Change

Description
CDS spread at the end of the event window minus the CDS spread
at the beginning of the event window (basis points).

Uncertainty

The number of Loughran-McDonald Financial-Uncertainty words
in the document divided by the total number of words in the
document that occur in the master dictionary (percentage).

Size

Logarithm of the market value of the firm.

ROA

Net Income (NI) plus income from Extraordinary items and
discontinued operations (XIDO) divided by the dollar amount of
assets in the firm (AT).

M/B

Market Value of the Firm divided by the Book Value of the firm's
assets.

Event period
equity return
(EPER)

Cumulative daily returns of the firm during the event period
obtained from CRSP.

Realized volatility
(Rvol)

Realized volatility (annualized) of the firm’s daily equity returns
over the past year.

VIX

Volatility Index is obtained from Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE).

Credit Rating
(CR)

Standard & Poor credit rating of a firm’s debt. CR takes values of 1
to 22 with AAA being the lowest value and D being the highest
value.

Risk-free rate (Rf)

Three-month U.S. treasury bill rate.

Term Spread (TS)

Ten-year U.S. treasury bond rate minus the three-month treasury
bill rate.
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Default Spread
(DS)

Moody’s Baa Corporate bond yield relative to yield on 10-year
treasury bond rate.

Earnings Surprise

Actual I/B/E/S earnings minus the median analysts’ forecast, scaled
by price at quarter end.

Fog Index

0.4*(average number of words per sentence + per cent of complex
words).

Flesch-Kincaid

0.39*(number of words/number of sentences) + 11.8*(number of
syllables/number of words) – 15.59.

Coleman-Liau

0.0588*(average number of letters per 100 words)
0.296*(average number of sentences per 100 words) – 15.8.

–
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Chapter 4

4

Does Managerial Structure in Mutual Funds Affect
Window Dressing?

4.1 Introduction
Window dressing is an agency problem in the mutual fund industry where
managers engage in portfolio manipulation by selling poorly performing stocks and
buying stocks that performed well over the reporting period. As a result, they have a
disproportionally higher percentage of well-performing stocks on the date of reporting.
This practice is unfavourably looked upon by investors as it affects portfolio value
through unnecessary trading costs and potentially priming the portfolio for lower future
returns. This agency problem occurs because some managers have an incentive to hide
their true managerial ability from investors. An important factor that affects the fund
managers’ incentives to window dress is the type of organizational (managerial) structure
at their fund. However, there has been little research on how organizational structure
dissuades fund managers from engaging in unproductive and undesirable efforts.
In this essay, I look at whether the type of organizational structure at mutual funds
affect the likelihood of window dressing. Specifically, I look at whether team-managed
funds (mutual funds with two or more fund managers) window dress less than singlemanaged funds (mutual funds with only one fund manager). Prior research shows that
team-managed organizations can lower the inclination to engage in deceptive behaviour
and that teams increase the cost of deception by greater peer monitoring (Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1991; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Along with peer monitoring, individuals working
in teams may also experience increased moral pressures such as guilt aversion (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006). Teams also reduce the benefits of cheating by dividing the total
output among several members, thus reducing each individual’s monetary incentives to
cheat (Ma, Moore, and Turnbull, 1988; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Acemoglu, Kremer,
and Mian, 2008). Additionally, some studies have found that fund managers are more
likely to engage in window dressing behaviour when they have poor performance
compared to the benchmark (Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014; Meier and Schaumburg,
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2004; He, Ng, and Wang, 2004; Ng and Wang, 2004). I add to this literature by
investigating if team-managed funds reduce the level of window dressing compared to
single-managed funds when they have poor performance.
I use data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Thomson Reuters,
and Morningstar Direct, which cover actively-managed U.S. domestic equity mutual
funds from 1998 to 2015. I consider the following styles of mutual funds: aggressive
growth, growth, and growth and income. Following Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014), I
measure the level of window dressing using backwards holdings return gap (BHRG),
which is the difference between the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end of quarter holdings and the fund’s actual
quarterly return. After accounting for several fund-specific variables, such as total net
assets under management, two-month performance, trading costs, and fund family size, I
find that, conditional on inferior performance, team-managed funds window dress less by
almost 50% when compared to single-managed funds. I also test if this effect increases
when the number of managers on a team is increased. Most of the differences between
team-managed and single-managed funds come from teams of two managers and teams
of 4+ managers. For example, two-manager teams window dress less by almost 20 basis
points and teams with 4+ managers windows dress less by almost 30 basis points when
compared to their single-managed counterparts. However, the difference between singlemanaged funds and those funds with teams with three managers is not significantly
different from zero in our sample and thus, I cannot conclude that window dressing
decreases with increases in team size.
I next examine if the internal governance mechanism of a fund family has any
impact on window dressing. Larger fund families tend to have more resources and better
internal governance mechanisms. For example, in larger families, each fund has its own
board of directors and an investment advisor, but in smaller fund families, a single board
oversees the activities of all funds within the family (Khorana, 1996). This results in
larger families monitoring their fund managers better and reducing the incentive of the
fund manager to engage in window dressing. I find exactly this result, as team-managed
funds do not differ from single-managed funds in the levels of window dressing among
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large fund families. However, among smaller fund families where internal governance
mechanisms are weaker, team-managed funds window dress less when compared to
single-managed funds.
Finally, I examine if manager experience and age affect the window dressing
incentives of a fund manager. Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) show that younger managers
are more likely to get fired for poor performance compared to older managers and that
career concerns and incentives differ vastly among more experienced, older managers vs
younger managers. An experienced manager who has already achieved a high position in
an industry is motivated to maintain that position. Thus, in periods of poor performance,
older and more experienced managers are more likely to engage in window dressing and
the results show exactly that. I find that team-managed funds window dress considerably
less than their single-managed counterparts among more experienced managers, whereas,
there is no difference between team-managed and single-managed funds among younger
managers.
The essay makes two major contributions to the existing literature. First, this is
the first essay in my knowledge to do a broad analysis on the effect of managerial
structure on window dressing in mutual funds. I find that conditional on poor
performance, team-managed funds window dress less than single-managed funds. This is
possibly due to team-managed funds having greater peer monitoring along with reduced
monetary and social incentives. These findings complement and extend the findings of
Patel and Sarkissian, (2018) who find that managerial structure decreases “portfolio
pumping,” which is another kind of deceptive practice. 19 Second, I find that the impact of
managerial structure is most effective when other governance mechanisms and incentive
structures are not in place.

19

Portfolio pumping is another deceptive mutual fund activity where the fund manager purchases already
held stocks to drive up stock prices and thereby fund values (Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed, 2002;
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Hu, Mclean, Pontiff, and Wang, 2014).
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section discusses
related research and outlines our main predictions. Section 4.3 describes the data, sample
selection, and variable construction. Section 4.4 reports the research design and main
empirical tests related to how team-managed funds affect window dressing. Section 4.5
considers two important alternative explanations for our results. Section 4.6 provides a
conclusion.

4.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development
4.2.1

Window Dressing in Mutual Funds
Investors evaluate a manager’s skill by comparing the fund’s past performance

with a benchmark. However, this comparison may not suffice as stock returns are volatile
and investors cannot know if a manager just got lucky or unlucky on some stock
purchases. This results in investors also paying attention to the portfolio holdings as an
additional signal to evaluate a manager’s skill (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny,
1991; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zhang, (2005, 2008); Cohen, Coval, and Pastor, 2005;
Jiang, Yao, and Yu, 2007).
Window dressing in mutual funds is a form of manipulation in which the money
managers alter their portfolio before the disclosure date to hide their true ability. This is
usually done by buying (selling) stocks that have done exceptionally well (poorly) over
the reporting period and results in disproportionally higher holdings of “good” stocks on
the date of disclosure. There exists ample empirical evidence of window dressing among
mutual funds. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, (1991) show that, in the months
leading up to the reporting date, pension funds sell more poorly performing “loser”
stocks, slow down the pace of sale of well performing “winner” stocks, increase the
purchases of winner stocks, and decrease the purchases of loser stocks. Musto, (1997)
shows that money market funds hold disproportionately more government securities just
before the disclosure date to give an impression that they are safer and more conservative
than they really are. Chevalier and Ellison, (1997) find that funds alter the composition of
their portfolios at the end of the year towards high-quality, less-risky stocks. Meier and
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Schaumbaug, (2004) find evidence of high turnover of stocks in the last days of the
quarter and find that poor performing funds are more likely to report misleading holdings.
He, Ng and Wang, (2004) and Ng and Wang, (2004) show that institutions whose
portfolios have underperformed the market tend to sell more poorly performing stocks in
proportion to their holdings than those whose portfolios have outperformed the market in
the final quarter of the year. Agarwal, Gay and Ling, (2014) provide a rationale for why
managers window dress. Investors can observe the fund return at the end of each quarter,
but funds have up to a 60-day window to report their holdings. Investors know of the
holdings only after the delay period and the performance during the delay period can
affect the investor’s interpretation of the two conflicting signals. If a poorly performing
manager decides to window dress towards the end of the quarter, and if the fund performs
well during the delay period, investors are less likely to attribute the signal conflict to
window dressing and reward the fund with higher flows than otherwise. However, if the
fund performs poorly during the delay period, then investors are more likely to attribute
the signal conflict to window dressing and punish the fund with lower flows. Overall,
window dressing behaviour is believed to be detrimental to investors’ returns as it affects
fund value through two ways: unnecessary trading costs, and potentially buying (selling)
overpriced (underpriced) stocks, priming the portfolio for future lower returns.

4.2.2

Teams, Deception, and Window Dressing
The idea that groups and individuals act differently is divided into two groups:

one that says decisions made by groups are inferior to that of individuals, and the other
that argues decisions made by groups are superior to that of individuals. In economics,
the negative effect of teams are associated with free-riding and indecisiveness, which
result in loss of productivity (e.g., see Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmusen, 1987; Nalbantian
and Schotter, 1997). Similarly in finance, some studies find no benefits of teamwork in
enhancing the performance of professional money managers (e.g., Chen, Hong, Huang,
and Kubik, 2004; Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 2010). However, there are many studies
that show the positive effects of teams. For example, Sah and Stiglitz, (1986) and Sharpe,
(1981) show that teams help diversify individuals’ opinions. Barry and Starks, (1984)
provide a theoretical setting suggesting that teams in investment funds may reduce
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portfolio risk. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, (2003) find that teams increase
productivity. Patel and Sarkissian, (2017) use equity mutual fund data and observe that
team-managed funds outperform single-managed ones without resorting to extra risk
taking.
As mentioned earlier, window dressing by mutual fund managers is a dishonest
activity which negatively affects investor’s returns. In times of poor fund performance,
engaging in window dressing activity is a way to hide managerial skill. A team
environment can change the temptation to window dress as it increases social pressure
and enables peer-monitoring. Employees can experience disutility if they find that their
peers engage in deceptive behaviour as the productivity of an employee is also a function
of the productivity of their co-workers (Mas and Moretti, 2009). Peer monitoring is also
important in labour markets as workers are often in a better position to monitor their coworkers than employers (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). Teams also provide different
compensation structure and reduce the benefits of deception. Kandel and Lazear (1992)
find that peer pressure and monitoring are more effective when all members of the
organization share profits. Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) use a career concerns
model and show that high powered incentives induce more productive effort from
employees but also more unproductive efforts. They show that working in teams reduces
the incentive to engage in unproductive and unethical behaviour. Patel and Sarkissian,
(2018) show that team-managed funds engage less in portfolio pumping activity. Thus, I
hypothesize that teams are less likely to window dress when they have poor performance.

4.3 Data, Sample Selection, and Variable Construction
4.3.1

Databases and Sample Selection
I use data from three sources: Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)

database; Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund database; and Morningstar Direct database.
The CRSP data provide information on mutual funds’ monthly returns, total net
assets (TNA), inception date, fee structure, fund age, investment objectives, and other
attributes. CRSP fund data are at the share class level (crsp_fundno), so I aggregate all
fund characteristics at the individual fund level (wficn) based on their previous month’s
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TNA to obtain value-weighted averages of monthly returns, annual expense ratios, and
turnovers. The holdings of each mutual fund are obtained from Thomson Financial on a
quarterly or semi-annual basis. The Thomson Financial database also includes the style of
the fund (Investment Objective Code). As the focus of this essay is on equity mutual
funds, I exclude international, municipal bonds, balanced, and bonds and preferred funds.
The remaining equity styles are aggressive growth, growth, and growth and income. This
dataset is merged with the CRSP database using a common identifier (wficn) MFLINKS
database from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Data on mutual fund managerial structure are obtained from Morningstar. The
Morningstar database contains the names of fund managers responsible for the
management of the fund each year and the exact joining and leaving dates of fund
managers. I determine the managerial structure of funds based on the total number of
fund managers at the end of each quarter. If a fund is managed by only one fund manager
at the end of the calendar year, I classify that fund as single-managed. If a fund is
managed by two or more fund managers, I classify that fund as team-managed. Further, I
divide team-managed funds into funds with two, three, four (or more) distinct fund
managers at the end of the calendar year, denoted 2FM, 3FM, and 4+FM, respectively.
This Morningstar database is then merged with the CRSP-Thomson database using the
fund cusip.20 I remove all fund-quarters where fund manager names or tenure dates are
missing and remove all funds that have a TNA of less than $10 million to remove the
effect of very small funds. Our final sample covers unique funds with 2,525 unique funds
and 69,045 fund-quarter observations from 1998–2015.

4.3.2

Variables Construction

Measure of Window Dressing
Backward Holdings Return Gap (BHRG) is the measure of window dressing. I
follow Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014) to compute backward holdings return gap, which

20

For unsuccessful merges, I match them using fund name and verify using fund TNA.
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is the difference between the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end of quarter holdings and the fund’s actual
quarterly return. The hypothetical portfolio is assumed to have been held throughout the
quarter. The higher the BHRG measure, the greater the likelihood of window dressing.
Other Variables
Alpha- The daily alphas are estimated based on the four-factor model from
Carhart, (1997). The daily alphas are summed to compute the 2-month alpha.
Manager Skill is the 12-month moving average of the monthly return gap as
calculated by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). The monthly return gap is the
difference between the actual fund return in a quarter and the return of a hypothetical
portfolio with last-reported holdings that are assumed to have been held throughout the
quarter. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) find that this measure is positively
associated with the future returns of a mutual fund.
Trade Cost is estimated using estimates from Keim and Madhavan, (1997),
similar to Wermers, (2000), who provide fitted regressions for total institutional
execution costs.21
Fund family TNA is the total net assets under the mutual fund family. I use the
fund family identifier (mgmt_cd) to identify the mutual fund family and aggregate the
TNA of all the funds under it.
The other variables I use in the analysis are: Style, which is a series of dummy
variables constructed from the investment objective code (IOC) from Thomson Financial
database; Fund TNA, which is the total net asset value of the fund; Fund Age, which is
the difference between a fund’s inception year and the current year; Expense, which is the

21

Refer to the Wermers, (2000) for more details.
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mutual fund’s annual expense ratio; and Load dummy, which is an indicator variable set
to 1 if a fund has a front-end or back-end load and 0 otherwise.

4.4 Results
4.4.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 4-1 (Panel A) shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations of all the
important variables used in our analysis. The average fund TNA is around $1.3 billion,
and the team-managed funds comprise around 65% of our observations. The mean value
for backwards holdings return gap is 58 basis points and the median value is 21 basis
points. Panel B of Table 4-1 shows the differences in fund characteristics between teammanaged and single-managed funds. When compared to single-managed funds, teams
window dress less by nine basis points every quarter. Panel C shows the correlations
between all the variables used in our analysis. Teams are negatively associated with
BHRG. Although these correlations use contemporaneous values, they indicate that teammanaged funds window dress less than single-managed funds.

4.4.2

Determinants of Window Dressing
I modify the regression specification used in Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014) to

the following:
𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(4.1)

where 𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the window dressing measure (remember to elaborate BHRG 10%
dummy) for fund 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the 2-month alpha of fund 𝑖, over the first two
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months of the quarter 𝑡. 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The other variables are the same as
mentioned in section 4.3.2. All the right-hand side variables except alpha are measured at
the beginning of the quarter (end of last quarter). I cluster standard errors at the fund
level. Table 4-2 reports the results of the regression. As expected, window dressing is
negatively related to the alpha and manager skill. The results are similar even in the
second regression specification where 𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
BHRG measure belongs in the top 10th percentile in the quarter and 0 otherwise.

4.4.3

Do Team-managed Funds Reduce Window Dressing?
Table 4-3 presents the results of the impact of teams on window dressing. The

first two columns are very similar to Table 4-2 but with a 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 variable. The
coefficient on 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is negative and significant only for the probit regression (first
column). It shows that teams are less likely to be among the top window dressers. In the
second column, which is a regular OLS, the coefficient on 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is not significant.
But as observed by Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014); Meier and Schaumburg, (2004); He,
Ng, and Wang, (2004); and Ng and Wang, (2004), the funds that perform poorly are the
most likely to window dress to hide their true managerial ability. I find similar results in
my sample where the BHRG measure is higher at lower levels of performance. To
answer the question if teams reduce window dressing in mutual funds, I need to compare
the difference in window dressing at lower levels of performance where funds are more
likely to window dress. Figure 1 shows the difference in levels of window dressing
among single-managed funds and team-managed funds at various levels of performance.
The difference in the BHRG measure between single-managed and team-managed funds
is considerably higher and significant at the lowest two deciles of performance. To test
this in a multivariate setting, I estimate the following regression:
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𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

(4.2)

where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a fund is team-managed and 0
otherwise. BottomPerf is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the performance rank is in
the last two deciles and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term
that captures the effect of team-managed funds when fund performance is poor. The rest
of the variables are the same as in equation 4.1. The hypothesis is that team-managed
funds window dress less than single-managed funds, especially when the fund has poor
performance. For this to be correct, β2+β3 < β3 or β2 should be negative. The third
column of Table 4-3 presents the results of equation 4.2. The coefficient on the
interaction term β2 is negative and statistically significant. This means that among poorly
performing funds every quarter, team-managed funds window dress less by 20 basis
points (almost 50%), when compared to single-managed funds.
I next look at whether team size has any impact on the level of window dressing.
If the portfolio is divided into equal parts, then each manager gets to manage only a part
of the incentive. Also, if the monitoring effect increases with team size, then I should
observe lower levels of window dressing with increases in team size. Table 4-4 reports
the results of the regression where column (1) compares the differences between singlemanaged funds and teams with two managers. Column (2) compares the differences
between single-managed funds and teams with three managers, and column (3) compares
the differences between single-managed funds and teams with four+ managers. The
coefficient on the interaction term β2 is negative, but significant only in the first and the
third regression. Teams with two managers window dress less by 20 basis points
compared to single-managed funds and teams of four+ managers window dress less by 30
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basis points compared to single-managed funds. When comparing single-managed funds
with teams of three managers, the coefficient is insignificant. Thus, I am unable to
conclude that window dressing activity reduces with increases in team size.

4.5 Alternative Explanations
4.5.1

Internal Governance
Ding and Wermers (2012) show that the mutual funds with better internal

governance mechanism perform better. They also show that fund families with more
independent directors are more likely to terminate underperforming inexperience
managers. This internal governance mechanism is dependent on the board of
directors/trustees, the investment advisor, and the underlying compensation contract. In
larger fund families, each fund typically has its own board of directors and an investment
advisor; but in smaller fund families, a single board oversees the activities of all funds
within the family (Khoranna, 1996). Fund managers from smaller fund families are more
likely to engage in window dressing behaviour than from larger fund families due to
lower monitoring. Thus, I expect that there should not be any difference in the window
dressing levels between team-managed funds and single-managed funds in fund families
with stronger internal governance. On the other hand, I expect a significant difference
between the window dressing levels of team-managed and single-managed funds among
fund families with weaker internal governance. I use the fund family’s TNA as a proxy
for the strength of internal governance, as larger fund families have more resources to
monitor their fund managers. Table 4-5 presents the results of the regression where the
sample is split into two: fund family TNA is below the median and fund family TNA is
above the median. The results are in line with the prediction and the coefficient on
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is negative and significant for funds that belong to smaller
fund families and the coefficient is insignificant for funds that belong to fund families.

4.5.2

Manager Experience
Another explanation that can affect window dressing is the age of the manager.

The theoretical models of Scharfstein and Stein, (1990), Zwiebel, (1995), and Avery and
Chevalier, (1999) predict that, in particular environments, managers’ career concerns
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may lead them to “herd” on a common action. Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) provide
empirical evidence to show that a mutual fund manager’s behaviour is affected by career
concerns. They find that even after controlling for performance, younger managers are
more likely to be punished for deviating from the herd. They show that the risk incentives
are very different for younger managers who have a whole career ahead of them than for
older managers who have potentially already reached a high position in the industry. The
older manager in a high position is motivated by the desire to maintain that position and
thus, is more likely to window dress. Therefore, I expect that there should not be any
difference in the window dressing levels between team-managed funds and singlemanaged funds among younger managers with career concerns, and that there should be a
significant difference between the window dressing levels of team-managed and singlemanaged funds among older managers. I use the average industry tenure of the managers
of the mutual fund to proxy for their experience in the industry. Table 4-6 reports the
results of the regression where the Average Manager Industry Tenure is added as a
control variable to the main specification. As expected, the variable is positive and
significantly associated with window dressing. The second and third columns of Table 46 report the results of the regression where the sample is split into two categories:
average industry tenure is below the median and average industry tenure is above the
median. The results are in line with the prediction and the coefficient on
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is insignificant for funds that have younger managers but is
negative and significant for funds with older fund managers with a reputation to protect.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this essay, I use a sample of active domestic U.S. equity mutual funds from
September 1998 to December 2015 to examine the impact of managerial structure on
their window dressing behaviour. The window dressing measure (BHRG) is measured at
a quarterly level following Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014). I find that team-managed
mutual funds window dress less than single-managed funds when the performance of the
fund is poor. The peer monitoring effect of teams is especially significant when the
internal governance of the fund family is not strong. I also find that older, more
experienced managers are more likely to engage in window dressing behaviour due to
different career concerns. These results hold irrespective of the additional controls related
to manager skill, fund size, turnover, and trade costs that can affect the propensity of a
manager to window dress. Given that window dressing is detrimental to mutual fund
value, these findings are significant and show that peer monitoring and the social benefits
of team-based organizational structure are helpful in reducing deceptive activity in the
mutual fund industry.
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Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable
Team
BHRG
Manager Skill
2-month alpha
TNA ($ million)
Expense
Flow
Turnover
Trade Cost
Fund Age
Fund Family TNA ($ million)

N

Mean

Median

69,045
0.6586
1.0000
69,045
0.0058
0.0021
69,045 -0.0001
-0.0001
69,045
0.0033
0.0032
69,045 1,323.71
294.60
69,045
0.0126
0.0121
69,045
0.0029
-0.0146
69,045
0.1042
0.0724
69,045
0.0010
0.0005
69,045
15.15
11.00
69,045 20,877.68 4,579.60

Min

Max

Std

0.0000
1.0000
0.4742
-0.0676
0.1230
0.0285
-0.0096
0.0098
0.0035
-0.0883
0.0918
0.0327
10.00
21,310.70 3,013.96
0.0040
0.0252
0.0043
-0.2776
0.5906
0.1237
0.0000
0.5547
0.1077
0.0000
0.0072
0.0013
1.00
91.00
13.2817
10.00 284,236.40 46,462.38
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Panel B: Teams and Single-managed Funds
Team
Variable
BHRG
Manager Skill
2-month alpha
TNA ($ million)
Flow
Expense
Turnover
Trade Cost
Fund Age
Fund Family TNA ($ million)

N

Mean

Single
N

Mean

45,473
0.0055
23,572
0.0064
45,473 -0.0001
23,572
0.0000
45,473
0.0031
23,572
0.0036
45,473 1,291.04
23,572
1,386.73
45,473
0.0023
23,572
0.0041
45,473
0.0124
23,572
0.0128
45,473
0.1018
23,572
0.1088
45,473
0.0010
23,572
0.0011
45,473
14.93
23,572
15.44
45,473 14,435.09 23,572.00 33,516.27

Difference
P value
(Team minus Single)

-0.0009
-0.0001
-0.0004
-95.6900
-0.0018
-0.0003
-0.0070
-0.0001
-0.5122
-19,081.18

<.001
<.001
0.0480
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
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Panel C: Correlations

BHRG
Manager Skill
2-month alpha
TNA
Expense
Flow
Turnover
Trade Cost
Fund Age
Fund Family TNA

Team

BHRG

-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
-0.04
-0.01
-0.03
-0.04
-0.02
-0.02

-0.01
-0.05
-0.03
0.04
-0.04
0.35
0.21
-0.01
-0.01

Manag
er Skill

2-month
alpha

-0.02
-0.03
0.02
0.06
0.04
0.08
-0.02
0.03

0.01
0.00
0.13
0.02
-0.09
-0.01
-0.01

TNA

-0.28
-0.01
-0.13
-0.17
0.38
0.41

Expen
se

0.01
0.12
0.22
-0.20
-0.28

Flow

Turnover

0.01
-0.03
-0.10
-0.01

0.67
-0.09
-0.07

Fund
Age

-0.17
-0.15

Family TNA

0.23

This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the important variables used in regressions. Team is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if more than one
manager manages the mutual fund. BHRG is the Backward Holdings Return Gap calculated as the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end-of-quarter holdings that are assumed to have been held throughout the quarter, and the fund’s actual quarterly
return. Manager Skill is the 12-month moving average of the monthly return gap. 2-month alpha is the alpha estimated based on the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997). TNA is the total net asset value of the fund. Expense is the mutual fund’s annual expense ratio. Turnover is the minimum of the dollar values of
purchases and sales in a quarter, divided by the total net assets at the beginning of the quarter. Fund Age is the age of the fund expressed in years. Fund Family
TNA is the total net asset value of the mutual fund’s family. Panel A describes the summary statistics. Panel B shows the differences in characteristics between
team-managed and single-managed funds. Panel C presents the correlations between all the variables. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 4-2: Determinants of Window Dressing
BHRG

2-month alphat

-0.061***
(0.000)
Manager Skillt-1
-0.340***
(0.002)
Expenset-1
0.085
(0.295)
Log(TNA)t-1
-0.203
(0.354)
Trade Costt-1
-0.639***
(0.008)
Loadt-1
-0.000
(0.808)
Turnovert-1
0.077***
(0.000)
Log(FFTNA)t-1
0.178
(0.346)
Fund Aget-1
0.049**
(0.029)
Time and Style Dummies
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.116
Number of Observations
64,161

BHRG 10%
Dummy
-2.623***
(0.000)
-10.414**
(0.020)
19.097***
(0.000)
-26.001
(0.081)
0.116
(0.989)
-0.029
(0.532)
3.461***
(0.000)
1.803
(0.881)
3.167**
(0.045)
Yes
0.110
64,161

This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings
Return Gap) on fund characteristics. BHRG 10% Dummy is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if
BHRG is in the top 10th percentile for a given quarter. The independent variables consist of: 2-month alpha;
Manager Skill; Expense; Log(TNA); Trade Cost; Load dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a fund
charges a front load and 0 otherwise; Turnover; Log(FFTNA), which is the logarithm of Fund Family
TNA; and Fund Age. The coefficients of Log(TNA), Log(FFTNA) and Fund Age have been multiplied by
1,000. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient
estimates. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 4-3: Teams and Window Dressing
BHRG 10% Dummy

BHRG

BHRG

-0.077**
(0.043)

-0.000
(0.700)

0.000
(0.845)
-0.002**
(0.024)
0.004***
(0.000)

Team
Team x Bottom Performance
Bottom Performance
2-month alphat
Manager Skillt-1
Expenset-1
Log(TNA)t-1
Trade Costt-1
Loadt-1
Turnovert-1
Log(FFTNA)t-1
Fund Aget-1

Time and Style Dummies
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations

-2.618***
(0.000)
-10.589**
(0.017)
18.839***
(0.000)
-24.920*
(0.093)
-0.364
(0.966)
-0.030
(0.518)
3.466***
(0.000)
0.628
(0.958)
2.966*
(0.060)
Yes
0.111
64,161

-0.061***
(0.000)
-0.341*** -0.336***
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.084
0.077
(0.301)
(0.343)
-0.200*
-0.189*
(0.363)
(0.386)
-0.641*** -0.630***
(0.008)
(0.009)
-0.000
-0.000
(0.808)
(0.834)
0.078*** 0.077***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.174
0.189
(0.361)
(0.319)
0.048*
0.048*
(0.031)
(0.032)
Yes
0.116
64,161

Yes
0.115
64,161

This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. BHRG 10% Dummy is an indicator variable,
which is equal to 1 if BHRG is in the top 10th percentile for a given quarter. The main independent
variables are team and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal
to 1 if the fund belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The rest of the independent variables are
the same as in Table 4-2. The standard errors are clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below
the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%,
and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 4-4: Team Size and Window Dressing

Team
Team x Bottom Performance
Bottom Performance
Manager Skillt-1
Expenset-1
Log(TNA)t-1
Trade Costt-1
Loadt-1
Turnovert-1
Log (Fund Family TNA) t-1
Fund Aget-1

Time and Style Dummies
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations

Single vs 2
Managers

Single vs 3
Managers

Single vs 4+
Managers

0.001
(0.425)
-0.002**
(0.015)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.481***
(0.000)
0.066
(0.502)
-0.162
(0.572)
-0.546*
(0.090)
0.000
(0.764)
0.077***
(0.000)
0.282
(0.204)
0.059**
(0.038)

-0.000
(0.917)
-0.001
(0.424)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.374**
(0.017)
0.043
(0.687)
0.080
(0.800)
-0.442
(0.212)
0.000
(0.796)
0.079***
(0.000)
0.037
(0.883)
0.047**
(0.138)

0.001*
(0.065)
-0.003***
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.377**
(0.027)
-0.010
(0.926)
0.039
(0.906)
-0.375
(0.361)
0.001
(0.584)
0.078***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.976)
0.054**
(0.122)

Yes
0.113
40,999

Yes
0.118
32,059

Yes
0.119
27,287

This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The rest of the independent variables are the same as in
Table 4-2. The first column only contains observations of mutual funds with 1 manager and 2 managers.
The second column only contains observations of mutual funds with 1 manager and 3 managers, and the
final column only contains observations with 1 manager and 4+ managers. The standard errors are clustered
at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 1999
to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 4-5: Fund Family Governance and Window Dressing
Fund Family TNA <Median Fund Family TNA>Median

Team x Bottom Performance
Team
Bottom Performance
Manager Skillt-1
Expenset-1
Log(TNA)t-1
Trade Costt-1
Loadt-1
Turnovert-1
Fund Age
Time and Style Dummies
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations

-0.002**
(0.049)
-0.000
(0.716)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.335***
(0.003)
0.092
(0.417)
0.220
(0.499)
-0.603*
(0.059)
-0.001
(0.385)
0.087***
(0.000)
0.012
(0.732)
Yes
0.130
31,645

-0.001
(0.469)
0.000
(0.845)
0.002***
(0.006)
-0.336***
(0.003)
0.028
(0.787)
-0.101
(0.658)
-0.859***
(0.005)
0.001
(0.370)
0.068***
(0.000)
0.057
(0.032)
Yes
0.097
34,793

This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4-2.
The first column only contains observations where the Fund Family TNA is below the median Fund Family
TNA. The second column only contains observations where the Fund Family TNA is above the median.
The standard errors are clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.
The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated
by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 4-6: Manager Industry Tenure and Window Dressing
Full Sample Tenure < 5 years Tenure >= 5 years
Team
Bottom Performance
Team x Bottom Performance
Manager Skillt-1
Expenset-1
Log(TNA)t-1
Trade Costt-1
Loadt-1
Turnovert-1
Log(FFTNA)t-1
Fund Age
Avg Manager Industry Tenuret-1
Time and Style Dummies
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations

0.000
(0.686)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.002**
(0.022)
-0.360***
(0.001)
0.063
(0.449)
-0.227
(0.299)
-0.677***
(0.006)
0.000
(0.996)
0.080***
(0.000)
0.206
(0.282)
0.046**
(0.039)
0.094*
(0.074)
Yes
0.119
62,286

0.001
(0.280)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.268)
-0.469***
(0.002)
0.100
(0.364)
0.374
(0.186)
-0.799**
(0.028)
-0.001
(0.286)
0.077***
(0.000)
-0.168
(0.534)
0.040**
(0.190)

-0.000
(0.502)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.002**
(0.033)
-0.177
(0.230)
0.074
(0.449)
-0.619
(0.025)
-0.529**
(0.032)
0.000
(0.579)
0.078***
(0.000)
0.468
(0.031)
0.059**
(0.026)

Yes
0.104
28,473

Yes
0.130
37,539

This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4-2
with the addition of Average Manager Industry Tenure. The first column contains all the observations. The
second column only contains observations where the average tenure is below the median. The second
column only contains observations where the average tenure is above the median. The standard errors are
clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is
from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
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Chapter 5
The thesis contributes to the finance literature in the following ways. Chapter 2
contributes to the growing literature on the role of investors on the corporate social
responsibility of a firm. I employ a novel measure of measuring CSR-friendly and CSRunfriendly ownership. Using a sample of all-equity U.S. mutual funds, I compute a CSR
score for every mutual fund based on their holdings. Using this measure, I identify a
mutual fund as CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly and then calculate the total amount of
CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year. The results also
show that CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership are important determinants of a
firm’s CSR. Upon further investigation, the results reveal that CSR-friendly ownership is
associated with future increases in CSR strengths and future decreases in CSR
weaknesses. Likewise, CSR-unfriendly ownership is associated with future decreases in
CSR strengths and has no effect on the future changes in the CSR weaknesses of a firm.
The study also shows a direct channel through which CSR-friendly mutual funds can
affect the CSR of a firm. Firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are more likely to
have executive compensation contracts linked to social performance.
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of linguistic tone in the pricing of CDS
contracts in credit markets alongside “quantitative” information from accounting
disclosures. We find that credit markets react, measured by changes in CDS spreads,
negatively to the uncertain tone expressed in the firms’ accounting disclosures.
Consistent with the Duffie and Lando (2001) model, the results show that uncertainty
expressed in the accounting disclosures affects the term structure of credit spreads and
that short-term maturities are more sensitive to the uncertain tone than long-term
maturities. Taken together, these results underscore the importance of the linguistic tone
of accounting disclosures, which influences investors’ assessments about the firms’
future credit risks.
These findings add to the existing accounting and finance literature that has
mainly focused on the quantitative aspects of accounting disclosures in the pricing of
CDS contracts such as earnings, accrual, and cash flow information. The results also add
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to the growing literature that examines the impact of textual analysis on valuation of
financial assets. Our results have implications for managers as well as regulators. As
investors pay close attention to not only the quantitative information but also to how
managers express their views in the disclosures, managers should be extremely careful in
articulating firm-related information. The managers can significantly reduce valuation
risks by simply choosing the right words. From a regulatory perspective, our results show
the incremental valuation relevance of required qualitative information. Regulators can
encourage firms to disclose more nonfinancial information that can improve the price
discovery mechanism in the market.
In Chapter 4, I use a sample of active domestic U.S. equity mutual funds from
September 1998 to December 2015 to examine the impact of managerial structure on the
window dressing behaviour. Window Dressing is measured at a quarterly level by
computing the backwards holdings return gap. I find that team-managed mutual funds
window dress much less than single-managed funds when the performance of the fund is
poor. I also investigate the circumstances under which team-managed funds have the
most impact in reducing window dressing and find that older, more experienced
managers are more likely to engage in window dressing behaviour due to different career
concerns. I also find that team-managed funds reduce window dressing mostly when
other monitoring mechanisms are weaker (smaller fund families). These results hold
irrespective of the additional controls related to manager skill, fund size, turnover, and
trade costs that can affect the propensity of a manager to window dress. Given that
window dressing is value destroying, these findings are significant and show that peer
monitoring and the social benefits of team-based organizational structure are helpful in
reducing deceptive activity in the mutual fund industry when other monitoring
mechanisms are not effective.
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